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INTRODUCTION 
Legal claims often arise out of deliberate conduct with 
alleged unintended or unanticipated harmful consequences, 
such as claims based on faulty workmanship, horseplay, or 
practical jokes.  While these legal claims, if proved, will 
generate legal liability, often the more immediate concern for 
the defendant is whether these legal claims trigger the 
defendant’s liability insurance, with its concomitant duties of 
defense and indemnity. 
Liability insurance in the United States, at least for 
claims involving bodily injury and property damage, is 
commonly limited to claims involving “accidents.”  As a result, 
courts are often confronted with the question whether an 
insured’s deliberative conduct establishes an accident.  For 
example, if the insured deliberately designs or constructs a 
 
 * Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, California. 
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product, but that product as designed or constructed is 
defective and results in bodily injury or property damage, is 
there an accident?  If an insured deliberately cuts corners to 
save money in performing the construction contract, is a loss 
resulting from “corner cutting” an accident?  If an insured 
plays a practical joke on another, expecting that the other will 
experience some slight discomfort or annoyance, but the 
practical joke backfires resulting in unintended, serious 
injury, is the loss an accident?  In all of these cases, the 
actions of the insured were deliberate, but the consequences 
were unintended or unexpected.  Should the resulting loss be 
characterized as accidental for purposes of liability insurance 
coverage? 
There is a natural relationship between insurance and 
accidents.  If you ask a layperson what insurance covers, she 
would probably say “an accident.”  By the same token, a 
layperson would likely understand that insurance does not 
extend to deliberately incurred losses.  If the insured 
deliberately burns down his house, the arson loss is not 
considered “an accident.”1  As a general proposition, one who 
has obtained insurance against a certain type of loss cannot 
expect to recover the benefit of insurance when one 
intentionally causes the very loss one sought to protect 
oneself against.2  Loss that is consciously and deliberately 
brought about by the insured strikes us intuitively as an 
inappropriate subject for indemnification through insurance.3
 
 1. See Home Sav. of Am., F.S.B. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 
799 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he named insured who commits arson in order to 
recover under a homeowner’s policy will be barred from collecting on the 
policy.”). 
  
Yet, while that intuition is easily expressed, it is applied with 
 2. CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (2009) (“Insurance is a contract whereby one 
undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from 
a contingent or unknown event.”); see 7A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4492 (1982) (“A basic principle of 
insurance law is that insurance will provide coverage only for fortuitous 
losses.”); see also LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 
102:7 (rev. ed. 2013) (“Implicit in the concept of insurance is that the loss occur 
as a result of an event that is fortuitous, rather than planned, intended or 
anticipated.”). 
 3. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(b), at 
497–99 (1988); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT 
LAW, § 8.2.3, at 194–95 (1987) (stating that allowing insurance for deliberately 
inflicted harm would incentivize insureds to inflict harm). 
FISCHER FINAL 4/26/2014  1:16 PM 
2014] CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW 71 
difficulty in the legal system.  Much like “beauty”4 and 
“pornography,”5
In recent years, California courts have struggled to 
determine where the line lies between covered accidents and 
uncovered deliberative acts.  Sometimes the courts 
understand an accident as a fortuitous event,
 an “accident” may be more easily identified 
ex post than defined and understood, ex ante. 
6 other times the 
courts understand an accident as a fortuitous injury.7  
Sometimes the courts combine the two concepts and add the 
filter of intent or expectation, e.g., did the insured intend or 
expect that his conduct would result in harm to another.8
 
 4. The subjectivity of the perception of beauty is expressed by the idiom 
“beauty is in the eye of the beholder.”  See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, LOVE’S 
LABOUR’S LOST act 2, sc. 1 (“beauty is bought by judgment of the eye”). 
  
These formulations confuse whether the emphasis is on the 
conduct that causes the loss or on the loss resulting from the 
conduct.  That confusion results in inconsistency in the case 
law. 
 5. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material [hard-core 
pornography] I understand to be embraced within the shorthand description; 
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I 
see it . . . .”). 
 6. See Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(involving claim for coverage arising out of acts of sexual activity with another). 
In terms of fortuity and/or foreseeability, both the means as well as the 
result must be foreseen, involuntary, unexpected, and unusual. We 
agree coverage is not always precluded merely because the insured 
acted intentionally and the victim was injured. An accident, however, is 
never present when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some 
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs 
that produces the damage. Clearly, where the insured acted 
deliberately with the intent to cause injury, the conduct would not be 
deemed an accident. Moreover, where the insured intended all of the 
acts that resulted in the victim’s injury, the event may not be deemed 
an “accident” merely because the insured did not intend to cause 
injury. Conversely, an “accident” exists when any aspect in the causal 
series of events leading to the injury or damage was unintended by the 
insured and a matter of fortuity. 
Id. at 279 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7. See Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 
881, 884 (Cal. 1959) (defining an “accident” as an “undesigned happening or 
consequence from a known or unknown cause”). 
 8. See Northland Ins. Co. v. Briones, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 137 (Ct. App. 
2000) (“Cases also hold that if an insured intends to do an act that results in 
injury, whether or not there was any expectation or intent that harm would 
result from the act, there is no covered “accident” or “occurrence” under the 
policy.”) (citations omitted). 
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We should not be surprised at some level of inconsistency 
in the case law.  Decision making is a human enterprise and 
judges will necessarily disagree over the application of rules 
and principles to specific situations at the margin.  
Inconsistency, however, becomes a concern when it relates to 
core doctrinal concepts.  That is the case here.  It is 
fundamental to insurance that coverage is extended to 
accidental or fortuitous losses.9  Imprecision as to the legal 
definition of an accident creates substantial uncertainty over 
the availability of “bodily injury” and “property damage” 
coverage under standard liability insurance because the 
concept of “accident” is integral to coverage.  This is a 
particularly acute problem in California because the courts 
have used the concept of an accident in defining the state’s 
statutory prohibition against insuring for loss caused by 
“willful act of the insured,”10 thus potentially extending the 
understanding of the term “accident” to all insurance 
policies.11
In this article, I explore California’s recent turn in 
determining what is “an accident” for purposes of liability 
insurance coverage.  The focus is on section 533 of the 
California Insurance Code.  I adopt this approach for two 
reasons.  First, willful action has come to be understood by 




 9. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
  Second, 
section 533 has recently received an expansive interpretation 
 10. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (“An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the 
willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the 
insured, or of the insured’s agents or others.”).  
 11. See J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991). (“Section 
533 is ‘an implied exclusionary clause which by statute is to be read into all 
insurance policies.’ ”  (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Employer's Ins. Co., 
159 Cal. App. 3d 277, 284 (Ct. App. 1984)); see also B & E Convalescent Ctr. v. 
State Comp. Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, of course, the rejection of the coverage obligation does not 
depend upon express policy language. The coverage preclusion here is a 
statutory one imported into the policy as a matter of law. The question 
is, does that make any difference? We have been presented with and 
can divine no reason why it should. Section 533, as an implied term of 
the State Fund liability policy, is as much a part of the insurance 
contract as any express exclusion. 
Id. at 909 (citations omitted).  
 12. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 690, 718 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Prior to 1966, standard liability policies covered 
injuries ‘caused by accident.’ The words ‘caused by accident’ served to exclude 
coverage from willful acts of the insured.”). 
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that creates problems when the statutory mandate is 
integrated with the standard liability insurance policy.  This 
article criticizes that expansion and examines how section 
533 and standard liability insurance policies should work 
together.  The article concludes that section 533’s statutory 
test should be limited to overarching public policy concerns; 
that the current tests violate that principle; and, that the 
California Supreme Court should restore order to this area of 
the law by returning to its earlier, narrow interpretation of 
the statute to specifically intended losses. 
I. CURRENT POLICY LANGUAGE 
An insurance policy is basically a contract between the 
insured and the insurer.13  The basic form for many liability 
insurance policies in California, and nationally, is the 
standard form Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy.14  
The current standard form is referred to as an “occurrence” 
policy.15  Although the CGL policy changed from an accident 
to occurrence form after 1966, the change was less dramatic 
in substance than usually acknowledged. Under Coverage A 
of the CGL policy, the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured 
for damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay 
because of bodily injury or property damage.16  A critical 
component of coverage is that the injury must “occur” during 
the policy period and be caused by “an occurrence.”17
 
 13. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
653, 659 (2013) (“Courts commonly remind the parties that an insurance policy 
is, after all, a contract, and that departures from the contract must be limited if 
the contract is to have any meaning.”). 
  If it 
 14. The Insurance Service Office (ISO) provides standardized policy 
language based on actuarial and rating information it collects.  See Harford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (describing the functions of the 
ISO). 
 15. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 913 P.2d 878, 891 (Cal. 
1995). 
 16. Coverage A of the standard ISO CGL policy provides coverage for bodily 
injury and property damage caused by the insured.  Coverage B of the policy 
provides coverage for certain enumerated harm caused by the insured, such as 
advertising injury.  ISO PROPERTIES, INC., FORM NO. CG 00 01 12 07, 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM 1–8 (2006) [hereinafter GENERAL 
LIABILITY FORM], available at http://www.sloanmason.com/files/pdf/ISO% 
20PDF%20CG%2000%2001%2012%2007.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 1.  Most California courts have held that the “occurrence” happens 
in the policy period when actual injury (bodily injury or property damage) 
occurs.  See Hallmark Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Ct. App. 
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does, a prima facie case of coverage is established and the 
insurer must assume those duties to which it has committed 
itself under the policy, unless the insurer can establish a 
policy defense.18
Standing alone, the terms “occur” and “occurrence” are 
very broad.  The term “occurrence” has been interpreted as a 
“happening” or an “event.”
 
19
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions.
  The 1966 change in 
nomenclature did not, however, fundamentally alter the scope 
of coverage because the occurrence policy is a misnomer.  The 
CGL policy language actually defines an occurrence as an 
accident for most instances: 
20
This quoted language began to be used with the 1966 ISO 
CGL form, which at the time was described as the 
“Comprehensive” General Liability Form.  Prior to 1966, 
many liability policies defined coverage in terms of “damage 




Delta relies on Sylla v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. and 
Oil Base, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., in which the respective 
courts described “accident” as the occurrence which is the cause of the 
injury. . . . Delta invites us to disagree with Schrillo and the long line of 
California cases which have rejected the Sylla and Oil Base reasoning. 
We decline the invitation based on our conclusion that (1) the time of 
the accident is the time when the complaining party was actually 
injured; and (2) the definition of the time of the occurrence of an 
accident in Sylla, Oil Base, and Evanston is out of line with the 
prevailing rule in this state.  
Id. at 639–40 (citations omitted).  
 18. Establishing a policy defense that will excuse the insurer’s duty to 
provide a defense to its insured is a high burden in California.  See Montrose 
Chem., 861 P.2d at 1162 (stating that to establish a duty to defend the insured 
“must prove the existence of a potential for coverage;” the insurer, on the other 
hand to avoid the duty to defend “must establish the absence of any such 
potential”). 
 19. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Cal. 
1978); see also THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1177 (Erin McKean et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (defining an occurrence as “an incident or an event”).  
 20. GENERAL LIABILITY FORM, supra note 16 at 1.  For example, an eviction 
is an occurrence in the sense of an event, but it is not an accident.  Swain v. Cal. 
Cas. Co., 120 Cal Rptr. 2d 808, 812 (Ct. App. 2002). Similarly, a breach of 
contract is an event, but it is not an accident.  Stein-Brief Group, Inc. v. Home 
Indem. Co., 76 Cal Rptr. 2d 3, 8 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating that “nonaccidental 
acts arising out of a breach of contract do not constitute an ‘occurrence’ within 
the meaning of a CGL policy”). 
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by accident” meant the loss be sudden and unexpected;21 thus, 
the losses arising from gradual, progressive causes or events 
might not be covered.22  The 1966 formulation of coverage was 
designed to make explicit that gradual, progressive losses 
would be covered as an “occurrence,” unless the insurer 
specifically excluded such losses from coverage.23  The 1966 
reformulation did not, however, define all exposures, events, 
or happenings as “accidents.”  Only those continuous 
exposures resulting in bodily injury or property damage in the 
policy period were deemed occurrences under the policy 
language.24
 
 21. See, e.g., Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 334 
P.2d 881, 884 (Cal. 1959) (“The door failures [loss] were unexpected . . . . [T]hey 
occurred suddenly . . . . [W]e are concerned, not with a series of imperceptible 
events that finally culminated in a single tangible harm . . . but with a series of 
specific events, each of which manifested itself at an identifiable time and each 
of which caused identifiable harm at the time it occurred.”). 
  Thus, under the 1966 formulation, an 
 22. Am. Home Prod. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). 
The CGL evolved out of the difficulties faced by courts and parties in 
dealing with personal injuries and property damage sustained as a 
result of gradual processes. Prior to 1966, general liability policies 
covered liability because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including 
death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused 
by accident and arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined. The 
word accident suggested an intent to cover only sudden, unexpected but 
identifiable events. The courts were left in doubt as to whether, and to 
what extent, the standard policy was meant to cover liability for 
injuries that resulted from gradual processes, rather than from sudden 
events. 
Id. at 1500–01 (citation omitted).  
 23. The purpose of using the term “occurrence” rather than the term 
“accident” was to expand coverage only in the sense of eliminating the doubt 
about whether, and to what extent, a standard commercial general liability 
(CGL) policy was intended to cover liability for injuries that resulted from 
gradual processes, rather than sudden events.  APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra 
note 2, §§ 4492–4492.05; see also Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 
351 N.W.2d 156, 166 (Wis. 1984).  In one way the definition reduced coverage as 
it was specified that the insured’s viewpoint controlled, not the victim’s, as some 
courts had concluded.  See infra note 108. 
 24. ALLAN D. WINDT, 3 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES §11.3 (6th ed. 
2013). 
[L]iability policies typically afford coverage, subject to various 
limitations and exclusions, for property damage or bodily injury caused 
by an occurrence. An occurrence is typically defined to mean an 
accident, although the definition in recent policies also typically defines 
an occurrence to include a “continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions.” Although the latter provision somewhat broadens the scope 
of the term, it does not eliminate the need for an accident.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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“occurrence,” as contemplated by the policy, could arise in two 
ways: (1) an accident or (2) a continuing injurious exposure 
within the policy period. 
Post 1966 variations of the CGL policy have also included 
additional language that compliments the concept of fortuity 
embedded in the formulation of an occurrence as “an 
accident.”  Under these newer provisions, an occurrence must 
be “neither expected nor intended.”  The phrase can either be 
included in the definition of occurrence, or written as an 
exclusion to the coverage.  The “neither expected nor 
intended” language has created some problems concerning 
proper understanding of the CGL policy because the words 
“expected” and “intended” are also found when interpreting 
the word “accident.”25
With so much riding on a definition, one would expect a 
comprehensive, well delineated definition of the term 
“accident” in the policy.  Just the reverse is true.  Insurance 
policies do not define the term accident.  This raises two 
interrelated questions. First, why is the policy silent on this 
critical point?  Second, how is the term “accident” understood 
given policy silence? 
  The coverage term “accident” and the 
limitation phrase “neither expected nor intended” are, in 
effect, cognates of each other. 
II. WHAT IS AN ACCIDENT? 
In Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury 
Indemnity Co.26
No all-inclusive definition of the word ‘accident’ can be 
given.  It has been defined as “a casualty- something out of 
the usual course of events and which happens suddenly 
and unexpectedly and without design of the person 
injured. It includes any event which takes place without 
the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or 
affected by the event. Accident, as a source and cause of 
damage to property, within the terms of an accident 
policy, is an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned 
happening or consequence from either a known or an 
unknown cause.
 the Court defined an “accident” as follows: 
27
 
 25. See supra note 21; see also infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  
 
 26. 334 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1959).  
 27. Id. at 884 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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The quoted definition largely tracts dictionary 
definitions.28  The key terms are “suddenness” and 
“unexpectedness”; however, those terms are as abstract and 
as general as the term “accident.”  When all the terms are 
considered together, they provide some clarification; however, 
understanding the concept of an “accident” still requires the 
exercise of intuition and judgment.  What, after all, does it 
mean to say that an event is “sudden” or “unexpected”?  For 
example, if a home is destroyed by a tornado, is the loss 
“sudden” if the storm evolved and was tracked over a time 
period of several hours?  Was the loss “unexpected” if the 
house was constructed in an area known for its high incidence 
of tornados?  As numerous courts have noted, when these 
terms were paired in the qualified pollution (“sudden and 
accidental”) exclusion,29 the term “sudden” can be understood 
as synonymous with “unexpected” or it can be understood as 
in a temporal sense of “quick” as opposed to “delayed.”30  
Ultimately, definitions may help, but they cannot eliminate 
the inherent uncertainty of the term “accident.”31
 
 28. Courts frequently refer to standard English language dictionaries for 
assistance when interpreting insurance policy language.  See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1267 (Cal. 1990). 
 
 29. 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, §§ 
4.05[C], 14.11 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (discussing the rise and fall of the “qualified 
pollution exclusion” and the ascendancy of the “absolute pollution exclusion as a 
result of strict judicial construction of the former” because the use of the terms 
“sudden” and “accidental” was deemed ambiguous).  The exclusion is referred to 
as “qualified” because it excluded coverage for losses resulting from pollution 
unless the discharge, dispersal, or release of the pollutants was “sudden and 
accidental,” in which case the policy covered the resulting bodily injury or 
property damage.  Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the 
Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study 
in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVTL. L. 357, 370 (1991). 
 30. The issue was whether the terms “sudden” and “accidental” are 
equivalents or whether each term comprehends a different viewpoint with 
“sudden” encompassing the notion of temporality and “accidental” encompassing 
the notion of expectancy or intention.  See Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 
176, 182 n.8 (Alaska 1992) (noting disagreement in the cases over proper 
interpretation of the linked terms); see generally Claudia G. Catalono, 
Annotation, Construction of Qualified Pollution Exclusion Clause in Liability 
Insurance Policy, 88 A.L.R.5th 493 (2001). 
 31. For example, the California Supreme Court defined an accident in terms 
of temporal suddenness.  Geddes & Smith, 334 P.2d at 884.  Other courts, 
however, define accident as having the quality of unexpectedness without 
mentioning the concept of suddenness. Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury 
Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Minn. 1954) (“Accident, as a source and cause 
of damage to property, within the terms of an accident, is an unexpected, 
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Insurers respond to this uncertainty by relying on 
judicial resolution of the meaning of the term “accident.”  
Insurers appear to prefer a judicial resolution for several 
reasons.  First, insurers have apparently been unable to 
conjure up a satisfactory definition in the policy.  Too broad a 
definition will make risk exposure unacceptable from an 
underwriting perspective; too narrow a definition will make 
the risk exposure unacceptable from a sales perspective.  
Although insurance contracts are typically perceived as the 
ultimate form of adhesion contracts, insurers must still draft 
contracts with an eye to consumer32 and regulatory 
acceptance.33
Second, any policy definition of an “accident” is subject to 
the vicissitudes of the rules of insurance policy interpretation, 
which tend to favor policyholders over insurers.
  Insurers do not have a totally free hand when it 
comes to drafting policy language. 
34
 
unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from either a known or 
unknown cause.”).  
  No matter 
 32. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 913 P.2d 878, 903 (Cal. 
1995) (noting insured resistance as reason for industry decision to draft 
particular policy language).  
 33. Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 
107 (2007). 
The laws of every state require regulatory review and approval of 
insurance policies prior to their use. Statutes typically provide that 
regulators must disapprove a policy form that violates the insurance 
code; has titles or headings which are misleading; or is substantially 
illegible. A number of state statutes further require disapproval of a 
policy form where it contains inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading 
clauses, or exceptions and conditions that deceptively affect the risk 
purportedly assumed. Others mandate disapproval of any policy that 
contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, or inequitable, or contrary 
to public policy. 
States also regulate the format and appearance of insurance policies, 
typically specifying the size of the type and requiring a table of 
contents or index. The statutes also require spacing and formatting to 
aid comprehension. Many states impose “readability” standards. Some 
of these readability statutes require calculations involving syllable, 
word, and sentence counts, often specifying a particular maximum 
score on the Flesch Readability test (typically between 40–50; passages 
with scores of 90–100 are easily understandable by average 5th 
graders and passages with scores of 0–30 can be best understood by 
college graduates.). 
Id. at 128–29 (footnotes omitted); see also STEMPEL, supra note 29, § 9.01; 
STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 2.8 (2010). 
 34. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW (5th ed. 2012). 
The rules of general contract interpretation discussed in the foregoing 
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how painstakingly clear the insurer attempts to be, there is 
always some cognizable risk a court will find the language 
ambiguous.35  Insurance law trends towards pro-coverage 
rules of interpretation that seek to balance the playing field 
and reduce the insurer’s advantage as policy drafter.36  And 
while there is some disagreement whether this is right,37 and 
some disagreement over the degree to which courts 
deliberately override insurer draftsmanship,38 there is no 
disagreement that the rules of insurance policy interpretation 
favor policyholders to some extent.39





section are applicable to any contract. Some courts have said that 
insurance contracts are to be construed like any other contract, and 
nothing more is required. But most decisions are fairly read as putting 
insurance contracts in a different category, and applying some kind of 
heightened review or alternative interpretive principles.  
  Unless the court deems the term 
Id. § 25A[C].  California jurisprudence provides practical examples of this 
heightened review.  See, e.g., White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 313 
(Cal. 1985) (stating that contract terms providing coverage will be construed 
liberally, whereas terms restricting coverage (exclusions) will be construed 
narrowly); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 193, 194 
(Cal. 1971) (stating that the language of the insurance contract is to be 
construed in accordance with the reasonable understanding of a layperson); 
Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 117 P.2 669, 671 (Cal. 1941) 
(stating that if semantically possible, the contract will be construed so as to 
achieve its objective of securing indemnity to the insured for the loss to which 
the insurance relates). 
 35. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S. v. Dyess, 109 S.W.2d 
1263 (Ark. 1937) (“If appellant meant to exclude liability for double indemnity 
while riding as a passenger or otherwise in any kind of aircraft, why did it not 
say so in such plain language that a wayfaring man, though a fool, might not be 
deceived thereby?”) (emphasis added). 
 36. See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special 
Rules of Interpretation?: Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1001–08 
(1992) (listing pro-coverage rules). 
 37. See David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for 
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988); Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts 
Should not be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995). 
 38. Compare Fischer, supra note 36 (arguing that pro-coverage rules 
dominate), with Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance 
Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 543 (1996) (arguing that for the most part courts construe insurance 
contracts much like all other contracts). 
 39. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 37 (5th ed. 
2010). 
 40. Rafeiro v. Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 701, 706 n.4 (Ct. App. 
1970).  The pro-insured approach is also not applied where the policy language 
is in a form mandated by statute.  Interinsurance Exch. v. Marquez, 172 Cal. 
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“accident” to be ambiguous, which most courts have refused 
to do,41 the judicial interpretation will become the de jure 
meaning of the term.42  Insurers have found that the judicial 
definition of the term “accident” is acceptable for 
underwriting purposes and avoids the risk that the term will 
be construed with a policyholder bias.  While a court, if left 
untethered, might construe the term liberally in favor of the 
policyholder, the force of precedent and a settled judicial 
construction imposes constraint.43
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN “ACCIDENT” IN THE CONTEXT OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE? 
  For these reasons, 
insurers have delegated to the judiciary the task of defining 
the term “accident” rather than defining the term in the 
policy. 
California courts have developed several approaches in 
determining whether a loss was the result of an accident in 
the context of standard CGL policies.  The approaches 
purport to be dictated by section 533.44
 
Rptr. 263, 264 (Ct. App. 1981) (“Conceding that any ambiguity or uncertainty 
[in] an insurance policy will be construed against the insurer which caused the 
ambiguity, where the language is that of the Legislature, then that rule does 
not apply.”). 
  Section 533 provides: 
“An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of 
 41. See Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sturrock, 146 S.W.3d 123, 126 
(Tex. 2004).  There is a California decision to the contrary, but it has been 
repeatedly disapproved and not followed.  See Wolf Mach. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 183 Cal. Rptr. 695, 696–97 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting disapproval).  On the 
other hand, courts have found the term “occurrence,” if undefined in the policy, 
to be ambiguous.  See sources cited supra note 19; cf. World Trade Ctr. Props., 
L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 180 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving 
question whether terrorist attack on World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001 constituted one occurrence or more than one occurrence). 
 42. Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club, 211 P.3d 1083, 1086 (Cal. 
2009) (“In the context of liability insurance, an accident is an unexpected, 
unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from either a known or an 
unknown cause. This common law construction of the term “accident” becomes 
part of the policy and precludes any assertion that the term is ambiguous.”) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. This is not to state that all or even a majority of judges exhibit a pro-
policyholder bias in their interpretation of insurance contracts.  In drafting 
policy language, however, insurers will be concerned about those judges, of 
whom there are many, who will exhibit such an approach if given the 
opportunity to do so.  
 44. See cases cited supra note 11 (noting that California Insurance Code 
section 533 is an “implied exclusionary clause which by statute is to be read into 
all insurance policies.”). 
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the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the 
insured, or of the insured’s agents or others.”45  The statute 
distinguishes between a willful act and negligence without 
expressly acknowledging or addressing that negligence 
usually includes a willful act.46
It is difficult to conceive of any act, ultimately 
characterized as negligent, that does not have its roots in 
intentional, deliberate conduct.  Driving in excess of the speed 
limit, hitting an errant golf ball, creating a hazardous 
condition, or maintaining an attractive nuisance are all 
activities that are deliberate in origin yet yield consequences 
that are consistently deemed to be accidents.  The task for 
courts has been to devise a test that gives meaning to both 
the “willful act” and “negligence” elements of section 533.  
Dictionary definitions are unhelpful.  The standard dictionary 
definitions of “accident” tend to eschew references to 
negligence.
 
47  An earlier version of Black’s Law Dictionary 
made the distinction express.48  This would suggest that 
losses caused by negligence are not accidents.49  The current 
version of Black’s elides the issues by specifically referencing 
insurance law treatment in the definition,50
 
 45. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (2005). The provision was initially adopted in the 
early 1880s and has not been substantively modified since that time. Cal. Cas. 
Mgmt. Co. v. Martocchio, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).  
 but the definition 
 46. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991). 
The statutory language sheds little light on the precise question before 
us. (Nor is there any legislative history to assist us.) Read literally, 
section 533 is internally inconsistent. Its first sentence purports to 
exclude coverage for all willful acts. The second sentence, however, 
expressly provides that the insured’s negligence does not allow an 
insurer to disclaim coverage.  
Id. 
 47. See WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 11 
(Jean L. McKenchie et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983); WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 7 (1979) (using the word “careless[]” in its definition of “accident,” 
although it otherwise tracks the New Twentieth Century definition of 
“accident”). 
 48. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 30 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (noting that “[i]n its 
proper use the term [accident] excludes negligence”). 
 49. Dictionaries collect permissible usages of a word or term.  See, e.g., 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SAKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190, 1375–76 (Williams N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also LEXICOGRAPHY: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 5 (R.R.R. Hartmann ed., 1985).  Consequently, the 
omission of a usage evidences that the defined term does not include that usage 
within its understood meanings. 
 50. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 16 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN F. DOBBYN, 
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is self-referential as it relies on judicial treatment rather than 
popular usage.  The obvious problem is that if a statute 
barred insurance coverage for accidental losses, that bar 
would undermine the pillar of insurance upon which the 
modern edifice of tort liability is constructed.51  Not 
surprisingly, California courts historically refused to give 
section 533 a literal construction that would cause it to 
broadly preclude the availability of insurance for tort 
liability.52
For many years, California courts narrowly defined 
section 533’s prohibition on indemnity for “loss caused by 
willful act of the insured.”
 
53  In Clemmer v. Hartford 
Insurance Co.54 the California Supreme Court identified 
section 533’s willful act test as only encompassing situations 
when the insured harbored a “preconceived design” to inflict 
harm or injury.55
A “preconceived design” test permits, but does not 
require, coverage for losses that, while intentional, are not 
premeditated on the part of the insured.  As a consequence, it 
is left to the insurance policy to define and prescribe any 
narrower limits on coverage for losses resulting from the 
insured’s deliberate actions.
  This narrow approach essentially limited 
section 533 to instances when harm was premeditated, which 
was a high threshold that substantially limited the reach of 
the statute.  All losses that were not premeditated were 
resolved under the language of the policy. 
56
 
INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 128 (3d ed. 1996)). 
  This was generally 
 51. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 802 
(5th ed. 2005) (“One important effect of liability insurance is that it provides a 
fund available to pay judgments for injured persons, without which legal 
liability might be meaningless.”); see generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAMS, THE 
LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 
9/11 (2008) (noting the symbiotic relationship between liability insurance and 
tort law’s expansion throughout the twentieth century). 
 52. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 53. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (2005). 
 54. 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978). 
 55. Id. at 1110.   
 56. Krause v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., No. 07CC00537, 2010 WL 2993991, at 
*14 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2010). 
In sum, broad assault or battery exclusions have been held to be 
unambiguous and given effect in California and other states. But we 
disagree with the premise that any exercise of force to protect persons 
or property, whether self-defense or not, necessarily involves an assault 
or battery under the policy. As the out-of-state authorities above 
FISCHER FINAL 4/26/2014  1:16 PM 
2014] CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW 83 
accomplished by the inclusion of a provision that effectively 
defined covered events as “accidents” and excluded coverage 
for “bodily injury” or “property damage” “expected or intended 
by an insured.”  Insurers could also attempt to exclude 
coverage for deliberate conduct likely to cause bodily injury or 
property damage through a “criminal acts exclusion.”57
In J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K.
 
58 the 
California Supreme Court retreated somewhat from 
Clemmer’s “preconceived design” test,59
 
suggest, there may exist factual scenarios in which the use of physical 
force by an insured, which leads to bodily injury, does not entail a lack 
of possible coverage under an assault or battery exclusion. 
 but the Court did so 
under unusual facts.  The claim alleged sexual molestation of 
a child by the insured.  The coverage claim was based on the 
argument the molester did not intend to harm the child  The 
Court dismissed the application of the “preconceived design” 
test to child molestation claims noting that “child molestation 
is always wrongful as a matter of law” and child molestation 
Id. 
 57. See Daniel C. Edismoe & Pamela K. Edwards, Home Liability Coverage: 
Does the Criminal Acts Exclusion Work Where the “Expected or Intended” 
Exclusion Failed?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 707 (1998–1999).  
 58. 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1998).  
 59. Id. at 696 (referring to Clemmer’s “preconceived design” language as a 
“brief reference”). The court was correct; the reference was brief, but that was 
only because the court in Clemmer, identified the test as one followed by prior 
California courts when interpreting section 533.  This is what the Clemmer 
court said: 
The instruction given, Hartford asserts, had the effect of requiring the 
jury to find the existence of what amounted to a specific intent to kill in 
order to find willfulness. It is clear, however, that this argument not 
only ignores the specific language of the instruction which speaks in 
terms of intent to “shoot and harm,” not in terms of intent to kill but 
refuses to recognize the clear line of authority in this state to the effect 
that even an act which is “intentional” or “willful” within the meaning 
of traditional tort principles will not exonerate the insurer from 
liability under Insurance Code section 533 unless it is done with a 
“preconceived design to inflict injury.” (Walters v. American Ins. Co. 
(1960) 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 783, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665; see also Meyer v. 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. (1965) 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 327, 43 Cal. 
Rptr. 542; see generally Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 
263, 273–74 & n.12, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168, and cases there 
cited.) The instruction given by the trial court simply applied this 
principle to a situation in which the actor’s capacity to harbor the 
requisite “design” was placed in issue through evidence bearing upon 
his mental state. There was no error in this respect.  
Clemmer, 587 P2d at 1110.  The reference was “brief” because prior to J.C. 
Penney, the law was well settled. 
FISCHER FINAL 4/26/2014  1:16 PM 
84 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
is always intentional.60  The Court expressly advised the 
precedential force of the opinion would be constrained due to 
the specific facts of sexual molestation of a minor.61  The 
California Supreme Court’s cautionary language in J.C. 
Penney has, however, been ignored.62
J.C. Penney provided an opening that other courts have 
generously exploited. 
 
One approach emphasizes whether the manner by which 
the loss was produced was an accident.  A second approach 
rejects the idea that an accident can exist when the insured 
acts deliberately, but under a mistaken belief or without 
appreciation that the deliberate acts will produce the actual 
consequences realized.  A third approach emphasizes the 
extent to which the insured purposively engaged in the 
deliberate conduct.  All three approaches are somewhat 
closely connected, but vary in emphasizing different aspects 
of the concept of an accident.  This section briefly recaps the 
development of each approach, and the following section of 
this article then examines the approaches in further detail. 
The “manner by which the accident occurred” approach 
was articulated in a decision that was decided several years 
before J.C. Penney, but has proven influential as a gloss on 
the retreat from the “preconceived design” test that J.C. 
Penney inspired.63  Merced Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mendez,64 
like J.C. Penney, involved a claim of alleged sexual 
molestation of a child.  Like J.C. Penney, the Mendez court 
found the claim was not covered.65
 
 60. J.C. Penney, 804 P.2d at 697–98. 
  In doing so, the Mendez 
court drew a distinction between deliberate conduct that 
results in unintended consequence and deliberate conduct 
that operates through the instrumentality of unintended and 
 61. Id. at 700. 
Some of the amici curiae briefs in this case have suggested that a 
decision denying coverage will encourage insurers to deny coverage for 
many other types of wrongdoing. Not so. We cannot emphasize too 
strongly to the bench and bar the narrowness of the question before us. 
The only wrongdoing we address is the sexual molestation of a child. 
Whether other types of wrongdoing are also excluded from coverage as 
a matter of law by section 533 is not before us. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 62. See infra notes 63–76 and accompanying text.  
 63. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 64. 261 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  
 65. Id. at 281.  
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unexpected forces. 
We agree coverage is not always precluded merely because 
the insured acted intentionally and the victim was 
injured. An accident, however, is never present when the 
insured performs a deliberate act unless some additional, 
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening 
occurs that produces the damage. Clearly, where the 
insured acted deliberately with the intent to cause injury, 
the conduct would not be deemed an accident. Moreover, 
where the insured intended all of the acts that resulted in 
the victim’s injury, the event may not be deemed an 
“accident” merely because the insured did not intend to 
cause injury. Conversely, an “accident” exists when any 
aspect in the causal series of events leading to the injury 
or damage was unintended by the insured and a matter of 
fortuity.66
The second approach to comprehending what constitutes 
a “willful act” for purposes of section 533 is set forth in State 
Farm General Insurance Co. v. Frake.
 
67  In Frake, the insured 
and his friend (the claimant) had a history of engaging in a 
juvenile form of horseplay—hitting each other in the groin 
area.68  On the particular occasion, this horseplay led to 
serious injuries.  Not surprisingly, alcohol was involved.  
During a bout of drinking, the claimant (King) tried to strike 
the insured (Frake) in the groin as he had numerous times in 
the past without serious incident.  Frake blocked the strike.  
Later, Frake swung his arm at King, striking King in the 
groin, this time causing serious injury.  The jury found Frake 
was negligent and awarded $450,000 in damages.69  The 
insurer refused to provide indemnity and the coverage 
litigation ensued.  The court held that there was no coverage.  
Relying extensively on Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of 
the Automobile Club,70
In sum, Delgado contains no language indicating that the 
California Supreme Court intended to overrule prior case 
law holding that “the term ‘accident’ does not apply to an 
 the court distilled that the test as to 
whether there is an accident is the accidental nature of the 
conduct: 
 
 66. Id. at 279 (citation omitted).   
 67. 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301 (Ct. App. 2011).  
 68. Id. at 303. 
 69. Id. at 306. 
 70. 211 P.3d 1083 (Cal. 2009).  
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act’s consequences, but instead applies to the act itself.” 
Instead, the Court directed that the word accident “refers 
to the injury-producing acts of the insured,” and 
specifically approved prior case law that rejects the very 
argument Respondents present here.71
A third approach to the interpretation of section 533’s 
willful act exclusion is the incorporation of the concepts of 
expectation and intent into the definition of willful act.  For 




We conclude that section 533 prohibits indemnification of 
more than just intentional acts that are subjectively 
desired to cause harm and acts that are intentional, 
wrongful, and necessarily harmful regardless of subjective 
intent. A willful act under section 533 must also include a 
deliberate, liability-producing act that the individual, 
before acting, expected to cause harm. Conduct for which 
the law imposes liability, and which is expected or 
intended to result in damage, must be considered wrongful 
and willful. Therefore, section 533 precludes 
indemnification for liability arising from deliberate 
conduct that the insured expected or intended to cause 
damage.
 the claim involved patent infringement.  The court held 
that such a claim would fall within section 533 when the 
insured’s conduct in inducing an infringement constituted a 
“knowing, intentional, and purposeful act:” 
73
Courts adopting this approach have not consistently 
addressed how the concepts of “expected” or “intended” should 
be understood when considered in connection with the 
concept of “an accident” as opposed to the extensive case law 
that has developed with respect to the ISO standard form 
“expected-intended” exclusion in the CGL policy.
 
74  A gloss on 
the “expected-intended approach was adopted in Downey 
Venture v. LMI Insurance Co.,75
 
 71. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313.  
 where the court identified the 
central principle of section 533 as whether the insured’s “act 
 72. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  
 73. Id. at 736 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 74. James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and application of 
provision of liability insurance policy expressly excluding injuries intended or 
expected by insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984).  The case law is enormous as 
evidenced by the fact that the annotation currently exceeds 400 pages in length.  
 75. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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was both intentional and wrongful and the harm caused was 
inherent in or predictably resulted from the act.”76
IV. THE THREE APPROACHES AS GLOSSES ON LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
A. Accident Must Result from Non-Deliberate Conduct 
The first approach, articulated in Mendez, is essentially 
an application of language used in Accidental Death policies, 
which typically define the insured event as a “death by 
accidental means.”77  Courts interpreting these policies were 
confronted with the issue of whether a death “by accidental 
means” was different from a death “by accident” Some courts 
concluded the two phrasings were different.  For some courts, 
when the policy defined coverage in terms of “death by 
accidental means,” it was necessary to demonstrate that the 
manner or method by which the loss was inflicted was 
accidental.78
If we transpose the concept of “accidental means” to the 
context of a CGL policy, a touching that resulted from an 
inadvertent slip would be an accident because the means 
(cause) by which the loss arose was accidental—inadvertent 
 
 
 76. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).  Downey Venture collects many of the 
decisions addressing section 533’s statutory willful act exclusion in the opinion 
written by California’s foremost judicial authority on Insurance Law.  Justice 
Croskey’s distillation of a unifying principle is very close to that argued for in 
this article. 
 77. See Adam F. Scales, Man, God, and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of 
Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000) (extensively discussing 
the “accidental means” requirement).  
 78. Rock v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 156 P. 1029 (Cal. 1916).  The 
California Supreme Court identified the distinguishing feature of an accidental 
means policy as follows: 
The policy, it will be observed, does not insure against accidental death 
or injuries, but against injuries effected by accidental means. A 
differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured 
and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result. It 
is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen, 
but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act 
or occurrence which leads to the injury or death. . . . A person may do 
certain acts, the result of which acts may produce unforeseen 
consequences and may produce what is commonly called accidental 
death, but the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and 
did use, and was prepared to use. The means were not accidental, but 
the result may be accidental. 
Id. at 1031 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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slip.  On the other hand, if the act was intended, i.e., the 
insured deliberately “touched” the claimant, the loss would 
not be an accident, even if the insured intended no harm or 
mistakenly thought the claimant consented to the touching.  
This was the case in Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange,79 
where the court held that the insured’s mistaken belief that 
his deliberate act of touching a woman on her wrist and 
taking her to an alcove for the purpose of pursuing a sexual 
encounter was consented to by the woman did not transform 
his deliberate conduct into an accident.80
The “accidental means” test is often criticized,
 
81 primarily 
on the ground that it is divorced from the common 
understanding as to what constitutes an “accident.”82  While 
“accidental means” may reflect an intuitive conception for 
some of what constitutes an accident,83
 
 79. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 that concession 
 80. Id. at 655–56. 
 81. See Douglas R. Richmond, Drugs, Sex, and Accidental Death Insurance, 
45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 57, 66–70 (2009).   
 82. See Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., of Eng., 120 N.E. 
56 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) (involving death resulting from the deliberate act of 
puncturing a pimple with a needle). 
We think there is testimony from which a jury might find that the 
pimple had been punctured by some instrument, and that the result of 
the puncture was an infection of the tissues. If that is what happened, 
there was an accident. We have held that infection resulting from the 
use of a hypodermic needle is caused by ‘accidental means.’ The same 
thing must be true of infection caused by the puncture of a pimple. 
Unexpected consequences have resulted from an act which seemed 
trivial and innocent in the doing. Of itself, the scratch or the puncture 
was harmless. Unexpectedly it drove destructive germs beneath the 
skin, and thereby became lethal. To the scientist who traces the origin 
of disease there may seem to be no accident in all this. ‘Probably it is 
true to say that in the strictest sense, and dealing with the region of 
physical nature, there is no such thing as an accident.’ But our point of 
view in fixing the meaning of this contract must not be that of the 
scientist. It must be that of the average man. Such a man would say 
that the dire result, so tragically out of proportion to its trivial cause, 
was something unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, an unlooked-for 
mishap, and  so an accident. This test—the one that is applied in the 
common speech of men—is also the test to be applied by courts. 
Id. at 57 (citations omitted).  
 83. See Scales, supra note 77. 
This dichotomy between “means” and “results” weakly captures an 
intuitive and rough distinction between when someone (usually the 
insured) has done something incorrectly, which may seem accidental, 
and when something unpleasant has merely happened to the insured. 
However, courts and insurers did not readily grasp the limitations of 
thinking about accidental death insurance this way. While the logical 
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assumes that judicial intuitions square with popular 
intuitions.84
Those difficulties alone would bespeak caution before 
introducing the accidental means requirement to the virgin 
territory of liability insurance.  Accidental Death insurance is 
specific risk, first party coverage.  The insurance covers a 
specific type of loss, “accidental” death, rather than ordinary 
death covered by life insurance policies.  Liability insurance, 
on the other hand, is third party coverage designed to protect 
the insured from loss due to injury to others.  In the context of 
liability insurance, the term “accident” is not used to 
differentiate the risk that is insured; rather, it reaffirms that 
coverage is dependent on the loss being fortuitous,
  Moreover, even if the intuitive link is accepted, 
there is substantial disagreement as to how that intuitive 
concept can be applied to concrete cases. 
85 which 
means that the specific loss sustained by the claimant be 
unexpected, unintended, and unanticipated.86
 
space between “means” and “results” may be reasonably clear, 
insurance policies failed to articulate a definition of “accidental 
means”—something antecedent—which did not include some aspect of 
the “results” or consequences. 
   Liability 
insurance is not designed to compete with accidental death 
insurance and no reason is given by the courts to adopt the 
Id. at 208 (footnotes omitted).  
 84. See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation is 
Indispensable, If Only We Knew What For, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 153, 162–63 
(1998) (noting absence of evidence that a judge’s understanding of a party’s 
“reasonable expectations” is congruent with the party’s actual expectations and 
that a reasonableness test permits judges to adopt positions that cohere with 
the judge’s intuitive sense of fairness); see also Dan M. Kahan, David A. 
Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879–80 
(2009) (discussing the tendency of judges to fall victim to the cultural bias 
heuristic when resolving factual disputes).  The cultural bias heuristic is the 
tendency to assume that one’s culturally biased views of the world are shared by 
the larger, general community.  See id. at 861–62, 873. 
 85. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, §5.3(a); see also SCA Serv., Inc. v. 
Transp. Ins. Co., 646 N.E.2d 394 (Mass. 1995). 
[T]he basic purpose of insurance is to protect against fortuitous events 
and not against known certainties. Parties wager against the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specified event; the carrier insures 
against a risk, not a certainty. It follows from this general principle 
that an insured cannot insure against the consequences of an event 
which has already begun. Once the risk is eliminated, the contract for 
insurance no longer exists. 
Id. at 397 (citations omitted).  
 86. See SCA Serv., 646 N.E.2d at 397. 
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accidental death concept of an accident to liability insurance. 
What is significant about this transposition of the 
“accidental means” requirement to liability insurance is that 
courts have done so in the absence of the predicate fact that 
initially raised the issue in the accidental death context—
coverage defined as loss caused “by accidental means.”  CGL 
policies do not use “accidental means” language; coverage is 
defined in terms of an “occurrence,” which in turn is defined 
as an “accident.”87  In the context of Accidental Death policies, 
the presence of “accidental means” language was critical.  If 
the policy provided coverage for “death by accident,” a death 
that was unexpected, unintended, or the result of mistaken 
belief satisfied the requirement.88  California courts have not 
explained why the absence of “accidental means” language 
permits the use of an accidental means test.89
A number of courts have implied that an accidental-
means-type test may be justified, notwithstanding absence of 
“accidental means” language in the insurance contract, based 
on the distinction contained in the following, often cited 
hypothetical from Mendez: 
 
When a driver intentionally speeds and, as a result, 
negligently hits another car, the speeding would be an 
intentional act. However, the act directly responsible for 
the injury—hitting the other car—was not intended by the 
driver and was fortuitous. Accordingly, the occurrence 
resulting in injury would be deemed an accident. On the 
other hand, where the driver was speeding and 
deliberately hit another car, the act directly responsible 
for the injury—hitting the other car—would be intentional 
and any resulting injury would be directly caused by the 
driver’s intentional act.90
 
 87. The policy further defines an “accident” to include certain types of 
“exposure,” but that addition is not relevant here.  See GENERAL LIABILITY 
FORM, supra note 16, at 14. 
 
 88. See Olsen v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 900–01 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
 89. The courts might respond that they are not literally using the 
“accidental means” test and the term “accidental means” will not be found in the 
opinions.  But this would simply elevate form over substance.  Like Monsieur 
Jourdain, the courts have been speaking prose (“accidental means”) all this 
time.  MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN act 2, sc 4 (Philip Dwight Jones 
trans., Gutenberg Project ed. 2008), available at www.gutenberg.org/ 
ebooks/2992. 
 90. Merced Mut. Ins. Co v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279–80 (Ct. App. 
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The distinction has been cited and relied on by 
subsequent courts as supporting a narrow interpretation of 
the concept of an “accident.”91
There is no analytical or actual difference between 
deliberately putting the automobile in the intersection with 
the intent to not collide with another vehicle and deliberately 
putting the automobile in the intersection with the mistaken 
belief that there will not be a collision.  In each case, the 
deliberate act is the same.  Any resulting injury is deemed an 
accident not because the entry into the intersection was a 
mishap or was inadvertent, but because the resulting injury 
was not mentally contemplated, i.e., was unintended.  Of 
course, the closer the likelihood that the deliberate act will 
result in an accident, the more likely one would conclude the 
injury was an expected result of the act.  Deliberately striking 
another vehicle at some reasonable speed is likely to cause 
injury, but there is no disagreement on that issue.  The 
Mendez court’s hypothetical attempts to resolve a difficult 
issue by stating the obvious, but that does not resolve the 
deeper issues that are presented by deliberate action that 
results, somewhere down the causal chain, in an unexpected 
or unintended injury.
  The distinction does not, 
however, support the adoption of the “accidental means” 
approach.  Saying that the action constituted an accident 
because the insured intended to speed, but did not intend to 
strike the other car simply redefines an act (striking) as an 
unintended consequence of a prior act (speeding).  Why is this 
necessarily different from an intent to strike but not inflict 




1989).  The hypothetical pre-dates the Mendez decision.  See Meyer v. Pac. 
Emp’rs Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 542, 546 (Ct. App. 1965).  Ironically, in Meyer the 
hypothetical was used to illustrate that unanticipated consequences of even 
reckless conduct would qualify as an “accident.”  See id. 
 
 91. See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal Rptr. 3d 301, 310 (Ct. 
App. 2011); see also Civil Serv. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, No. A104876, 
2004 WL 1466214, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004); see also Chamberlain v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991); Commercial Underwriters 
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 710 n.8 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(depublished).  In two federal district court decisions, the hypothetical was 
noted, but its distinction was not relied on.  See Quigley v. Traveler’s Prop. Cas. 
Ins. Co., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also McGranahan v. 
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
 92. The Mendez court’s hypothetical is essentially an application of the last 
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The form of decision making reflected in the Mendez 
court’s hypothetical is flawed because it is inherently 
malleable.  The court’s approach can be used to redefine 
situations and reverse decisions in nearly any scenario where 
a court might have previously found the action accidental.  
For example, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court,93 
the court concluded that a trespass was not accidental when 
the act (entering the property of another) was done 
deliberately, but with the mistaken belief that it was lawful.  
This was deemed to be the same as deliberately striking a 
vehicle rather than accidently striking the vehicle as a result 
of speeding.  But the situation could just as easily be 
characterized as trespass (consequence) because of mistaken 
belief (act), as did the dissenting judge.94
Even if the “accidental means” test is applied, it does not 
support the distinction between speeding and deliberate 
striking that the Mendez court believed existed between the 
two methods of causing a loss and which underlie its speeding 
hypothetical.
  Indeed, there does 
not seem to be any reason to prefer one construction over the 
other as a matter of characterizing the cause—effect 
relationships, unless one is going to adopt a mind-body 
distinction that assumes that conduct is divorced from the 
mental commands that induce the conduct. 
95
 
or immediate cause test which has been generally rejected as a causation test in 
the area of liability insurance.  See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
  Speeding is intentional conduct.  An injury 
caused by speeding is not an injury caused by accidental 
means; rather, the injury would have to be caused by some 
inadvertent or negligent act or condition that operated 
through the medium of the speeding, such as a pothole or 
 93. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 94. Id. at 544–45; see also Mesa v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. C-03-02769 
RMW, 2004 WL 1753413, at *13 n.10 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004) (distinguishing 
situation (non-accidental) when insured engages in a sexual contact—in which 
case consequences are irrelevant because the consequences all flow from the 
intended contact—and the installation of a defective floor—in which case the 
consequences if unintended satisfy the requirement that the loss be accidental 
even though the loss flows from the intended act of installation); see also N.W. 
Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 356, 362–64 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1969) (holding that damage to land caused by the placement of a power 
line outside the allowable easement was an “accident;” while the placement of 
the line was deliberate, the injury was not inflicted intentionally because the 
line placement was thought to be within the easement). 
 95. See Fire Ins. Exch., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 544–45; see also supra notes 
90–94 and accompanying text. 
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uneven pavement that caused the insured to lose control of 
the vehicle resulting in the loss.  For the speeding to be 
deemed accidental there would have to be some unanticipated 
intervening action that caused the loss, e.g., unintended 
acceleration due to a defective throttle or floor pedal. 
This points out the fundamental problem with the 
application of the “accidental means” approach to liability 
insurance claims.  If applied consistently, it would operate to 
nullify coverage in many contexts when the presence and 
availability of insurance is accepted.96  This is particularly 
true to the extent courts hold, suggest, or imply that the 
“accidental means” type test is part of section 533, which 
applies to all insurance policies. 97  Limiting the test to 
Coverage A of the standard CGL policy means that coverage 
for bodily injury or property damage is constrained to some 
imprecise extent.  Tying the “accidental means” test to section 
533 means that Coverage B of the standard CGL policy is 
illusory as that coverage involves deliberate conduct that 
results in foreseeable economic loss.98
 
 96. N.W. Elec. Power, 451 S.W.2d at 363. 
  One doubts that this is 
what California courts intend, but the court’s loose language 
That instant defendant’s acts were intended did not exclude the 
unintended result from coverage under the policy in suit. To entertain a 
contrary view would work an exclusion from coverage of many, if not 
most, claims for damages arising out of the negligence of insureds and 
thus defeat the primary purpose for which liability insurance coverage 
is purchased. 
Id. 
 97. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 98. Coverage B of the standard form ISO CGL policy provides coverage for a 
series of offenses and deliberate actions often referred to as “business torts,” 
such as false arrest, malicious prosecution, wrongful eviction, defamation and 
disparagement, advertising injury, etc.  GENERAL LIABILITY FORM, supra note 
16.  Traditionally, California courts have not erected a per se ban to insuring 
these torts even though the wrongful conduct is intentional, as long as the 
resulting injury was unintended.  See Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603, 606–07 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Unlike liability coverage for property damage or bodily injury, personal 
injury coverage is not based on an accidental occurrence. Rather, it is 
triggered by one of the offenses listed in the policy. In the world of 
liability insurance, personal injury coverage applies to injury which 
arises out of the commission of certain enumerated acts or offenses. 
Id. at 606 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 388 
(Ct. App. 1993) (stating that “[i]n the world of liability insurance, personal 
injury coverage applies to injury which arises out of the commission of certain 
enumerated acts or offenses”). 
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and porous reasoning leads logically to that result.99
This scope problem has so far largely been avoided 
because the coverage issue has arisen in specialized contexts, 
such as child molestation, sexual misconduct, and sexual 
assault and battery.  In these contexts, the availability of 
insurance is questioned because of the socially deplorable 
nature of the misconduct.  The problem is that the “accidental 
means” test is not gauged to operate only in these limited, 
socially deplorable contexts, and this is particularly so when 
the test is appended to a statutory exclusion (section 533) 
that applies to all insurance contracts.  By adapting a quasi 
“accidental means” test to the question of whether a course of 
conduct is a willful act within section 533, the courts have 
brought an Uzi to a knife fight.  We are beginning to see this 
as courts begin to extend the coverage precedents developed 
in the area of sexual torts to non-sexual conduct such as 
horseplay and practical jokes.
 
100
B. Accident and Foreseeability 
 
The second approach courts have elicited from J.C. 
Penney Cas. Ins. Co. represents an amalgamation of three 
factors: (1) the means by which the loss occurred, (2) the 
chronology of events leading to the loss, and (3) a reluctance 
on the part of some courts in recognizing unforeseen or 
unanticipated consequences as an escape from willful actions.  
Although this approach is influenced by the accidental means 
test and perhaps mimics that test, I treat the second 
approach as a distinct approach because there appears to be a 
concern by some courts that too generous an interpretation of 
“unforeseen” or “unanticipated” consequences would 
eviscerate the section 533 statutory exclusion. That concern 




 99. The interpretation of “willful” acts in section 533 as excluding losses 
that directly result from deliberate conduct could be read as barring life 
insurance benefits when the insured commits suicide beyond the traditional one 
or two year policy exclusion for suicide.  It is highly unlikely courts intend this 
result, but it is clearly within the court’s formulation and, as noted previously, 
section 533 is an implied term in all insurance policies.  See supra note 11 and 
accompanying text.  
 100. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301 (Ct. 
App. 2011).  
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This approach was articulated in the State Farm General 
Ins. Co. v. Frake decision,101 which in turn relied heavily on 
Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile 
Club.102
Delgado involved a claim that the insured’s subjective 
belief that he was acting in self-defense raised the insurer’s 
duty to defend under Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.
  Frake, however, misapplied Delgado by overlooking 
the very limited and severely circumscribed holding in 
Delgado. 
103  The court 
rejected this contention, but did so with the specific reference 
that the insured’s claim of self-defense was  unreasonable as 
a matter of law.104
Here, Delgado’s complaint alleges acts of wrongdoing by 
the insured against him. Those are the acts that must be 
considered the starting point of the causal series of events, 
not the injured party’s acts that purportedly provoked the 
insured into committing assault and battery on Delgado. 
The term “accident” in the policy’s coverage clause refers 
to the injury-producing acts of the insured, not those of 
the injured party. In determining whether the injury is a 
result of an accident, taking into consideration acts or 
events before the insured’s acts would be illogical and 
contrary to California case law.
  The Delgado court did not consider 
Clemmer’s preconceived design test and addressed section 
533 only once in passing.  The Delgado court did, however, 
speak to the issue of unintended consequences, albeit, in a 
tightly constrained manner.  In responding to the insured’s 
contention that an unforeseen response by the claimant to 
deliberate conduct on the part of the insured would satisfy 
the requirement that the injury be the result of an accident, 
the Delgado court sought to distinguish different types of 
“unintended” consequences—those of the insured and those of 
the victim.  Only the acts of the insured were relevant to the 






 101. Id. at 309–10; see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 102. 211 P.3d 1083 (Cal. 2009). 
 103. Id. at 1089 (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966)).  
 104. Delgado, 211 P.3d at 1089.  
 105. Id. at 1091 (citations omitted). Delgado had received an assignment of 
the insured’s claim against the insurer. Thus, Delgado claimed the insurer had 
breached its duties to its insured.  Id. at 1085. 
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The distinction lends minimal support to the position 
taken in Frake that an accident requires that the event that 
produces the harm be inadvertent or accidental because 
Frake’s conclusion and application of the distinction ignores 
the very narrow context in which the Delgado court addressed 
the issue. 
Both Frake and Delgado accept the principle that 
unanticipated consequences may permit deliberate conduct to 
be deemed accidental rather than willful;106 however, each 
decision concludes that the principle does not apply in the 
case before the court.107  Both decisions fail to explain when 
unanticipated consequences would be deemed material to a 
determination that an accident has occurred.  For example, if 
the parties in Frake had been engaged in a different form of 
horseplay other than striking a sensitive area of male 
anatomy, such as the groin,108 would the claim that the loss 
was unforeseen or unanticipated be credited?  Frake and 
Delgado both involve situations when the court perceived that 
the likelihood of injury was so high that the court would 
neither consider the claim to the contrary nor permit the 
issue to be considered by a jury.109  This is the approach 
courts take with molestation cases where intent to harm is 
irrebuttably inferred.110
 
 106. Id. at 1088–89 (distinguishing between deliberate conduct intended to 
inflict injury and deliberate conduct (shielding) that is not intended to cause 
injury, but is intended to ward off a blow); Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310 
(noting that coverage is not “always precluded merely because the insured acted 
intentionally and the victim was injured” (quoting Quan v. Truck Ins. Exch., 79 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 143–43 (Ct. App. 1998))).  
  Had the court made a policy-based 
 107. Delgado, 211 P.3d at 1089–90; Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310. 
 108. See, e.g., Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 903–04 (Wis. 
1979) (holding that injury to co-player’s eye due to misguided bobby pin was not 
covered because of “expected-intended” exclusion).  
 109. Delgado, 211 P.3d at 1086 (stating that appeal was from granting of 
demurrer, which requires that all well-pleaded facts be admitted, to insured’s 
complaint that insurer breached duty to defend; the Supreme Court effectively 
affirmed the trial court’s decision); Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307 (stating that 
appeal was from cross motions for summary judgment, which requires that 
there be no triable issue of fact; the court reversed judgment for the insured and 
remanded with direction that judgment be entered for the insurer).  
 110. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991).  
We find nothing in the statute, however, to support defendants’ view 
that a child molester can disclaim an intent to harm his victim. There 
is no such thing as negligent or even reckless sexual molestation. The 
very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. 
The act is the harm. There cannot be one without the other. Thus, the 
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decision that certain activities are so inherently likely to 
cause injury that the insured cannot contend to the contrary, 
the decisions might not pose as great a threat to a workable 
understanding of the concept of an accident.  Each category 
would stand or fall on its own rationale.111  Unfortunately, the 
courts used a dysfunctional understanding of the term 
“accident,” obtained by an expansive interpretation of the 
willful act element of section 533, thereby decoupling the 
approach from its original application in child molestation 
cases and extending it into the general field of negligent 
conduct.112
Delgado also suggested that the causal sequence by 
which the loss occurs is relevant to determining whether the 
loss was willful, i.e., not an accident.  The suggestion was 
made in response to the claim that whenever a provocative 
act by the injured person is part of the causal chain of events 
that ultimately led to the insured’s injury-causing conduct—
here the striking of the groin as horseplay—the insured’s 
conduct should be considered accidental.  The court 
responded to the contention as follows: 
 
Delgado overlooks the context in which the Court of 
Appeal in Merced Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, made the 
statement in question. In the same paragraph, the court 
also observed: “[a]n accident, however, is never present 
when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some 
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen 
 
intent to molest is, by itself, the same as the intent to harm.  
Id. at 695.  Later, the court added: “Because child molestation is always wrong 
as a matter of law, the insured’s intent (or motive) is irrelevant . . . .”  Id. at 697 
(citation omitted). 
 111. On the merits, that argument that the conduct was inherently harmful 
may be difficult to make.  The facts (horseplay in Frake) or public policy (self-
defense in Delgado) may not lend themselves to the resolution the court wishes 
to reach, which may explain why the approach was not used. 
 112. This is not an approach limited to California.  In many cases when 
courts define the term “accident,” the case involves clear, anti-social conduct.  
See, e.g., Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E. 2d 1115, 1118 (Ohio 1996) 
(rejecting contention that harm caused by sexual molestation could be deemed 
an accident because no harm was intended by insured).  The problem that 
arises is whether the approach should be extended to less socially harmful 
contexts.  See Morner v. Giuliano, 857 N.E.2d 602, 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that discharge of BB gun which injured claimant could not be deemed 
an accident within the insured’s homeowner’s policy notwithstanding claim that 
loss was unintended). The allegation in the claim against the insured was that 
the shooter (the insured’s son) deliberately shot the BB gun with the intent to 
cause “a stinging sensation or a welt.”  Id. at 604.  
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happening occurs that produces the damage. Clearly, 
where the insured acted deliberately with the intent to 
cause injury, the conduct would not be deemed an 
accident.” Thus, the statement upon which Delgado 
relies—that an accident exists whenever any part of the 
causal events leading to the injury was unintended—
referred to events in the causal chain after the acts of the 
insured, not to events preceding the acts of the insured.113
The problem with this language is that it adopts a 
causation theory that is inconsistent with California common 
law.  This approach suggested by Delgado is a variation of the 
last or immediate cause test.
 
114  While this approach has 
found favor in some jurisdictions,115 California has adopted an 
approach that in the liability insurance context more closely 
aligns liability causation with coverage causation.116  The 
underlying idea is that absent unambiguous contract 
language to the contrary, liability exposure and liability 
coverage should be in alignment.117
 
 113. Delgado, 211 P.3d at 1091 (citations omitted).  
 
 114. See, e.g., Pan American World Airways v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).  Although the case involved a property insurance claim 
where causation principles are applied differently from liability insurance, the 
case is helpful in understanding the last or immediate cause approach.  In Pan 
American World Airways, hijackers seized a Boeing 747 over London.  The 
airplane was blown up after having been flown to Beirut and then to Cairo.  The 
passengers left the plane prior to it being destroyed by explosion.  The plane 
was insured, but the policy excluded loss resulting from “war,” “warlike 
operations,” “insurrection,” and similar events.  The court concluded: 
Remote causes of causes are not relevant to the characterization of an 
insurance loss. In the context of this commercial litigation, the 
causation inquiry stops at the efficient physical cause of the loss; it 
does not trace events back to their metaphysical beginnings. The words 
‘due to or resulting from’ limit the inquiry to the facts immediately 
surrounding the loss.  
Id. at 1006 (citations omitted); see generally Randall L. Smith and Fred A. 
Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 346 (2006) 
(discussing “immediate causation” approach). 
 115. Smith & Sampson, supra note 114, at 347 (noting that “[t]he immediate 
cause doctrine has largely been replaced by efficient proximate cause . . . ”).  
 116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 129 (Cal. 
1973) (stating that in a third party liability insurance context the proper 
causation test is “concurrent proximate cause[]”); see Garvey v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 705 (Cal. 1989) (stating that in first party property 
insurance context proper causation is “efficient proximate cause,” but 
reaffirming Partridge test for third party liability insurance). 
 117. Ellen S. Pryor, The Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ 
L. REV. 905, 906 n.3 (2006) (“[T]he existence of a connection between tort law 
and liability insurance markets cannot be contested.”) (citations omitted); see 
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C. Accident and Anticipation 
The third approach California courts have used to 
identify whether a loss is the result of an accident or willful 
act under section 533 is to determine whether the insured 
“expected” or “intended” the loss.  This approach shares 
similarities with the second approach in the attention given 
to whether the loss was deliberate.  In the second approach, 
whether the loss was deliberate is combined with a focus on 
the chronological progression of act and effect. In this third 
approach, the focus is entirely on the effect (loss) and the 
question is whether the loss was expected or intended at the 
time the insured acted to bring about the loss. 
The “expected-intended” language has origins in early 
definitions of the term “accident.”118  Today, liability 
insurance policies have taken the “expected-intended” 
language and placed it in an exclusion to coverage; however, 
even when it was part of the definition of an “occurrence” in 
the early versions of the 1966 standard form, many courts 
treated the language as a limitation on coverage and 
subjected the terms to the same scrutiny reserved for 
exclusions.119
The specific inclusion in the policy of the “neither 
expected nor intended” language raises several questions.  
First, does the language add anything to the standard 
understanding of the term “accident”?  In other words, 
standing alone would an “accident” be a loss that was neither 
expected nor intended?  If a loss is “expected,” is the loss an 
accident? If a loss is “intended,” is the loss an accident?  
While the “standpoint of the insured” language provides some 
 
 
James M. Fischer, The Presence of Insurance and the Legal Allocation of Risk, 2 
CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1996) (noting general judicial policy to align and match legal 
risk to party with insurance); see sources cited supra note 51.   
 118. See infra Part V.  
 119. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 
1178, 1205 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[U]nder New York law, the exclusionary effect of 
policy language, not its placement, controls allocation of the burden of proof.”); 
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1126 (N.J. 1998) 
(stating that unexpected and unintended language constitutes an exclusion; the 
burden of proof is, thus, with the insurer, regardless of whether language is 
located in an exclusion section or is within the coverage section of the policy as 
part of the definition of an “occurrence”); contra Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 691–92 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
placement within the policy controls whether the insured has the burden of 
proof). 
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clarification by eliminating the argument that the victim’s 
perspective is critical,120
Second, and perhaps as a consequence of the first 
question, the presence of the “neither expected nor intended” 
exclusion has induced courts, when interpreting these terms, 
to move towards an evaluation of the mental state of the 
insured whose conduct proximately causes the loss?  Both 
“expected” and “intended” have been interpreted with respect 
to the insured’s mental state.  And while courts have differed 
whether the terms are synonymous
 it is questionable whether the 
“neither expected nor intended” language adds or subtracts 
from the basic understanding of “accident.”  The provision 
simply repeats language courts have used to define an 
accident. 
121 or express distinct, 
albeit complimentary, views of the insured’s mental state,122
 
 120. See, e.g., Patrons v. Oxford Mut. Ins. Co v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 890–91 
(Me. 1981) (victim’s viewpoint determines whether loss was intentional or 
accidental).  Courts, today, generally reject this approach.  See Delgado v. 
Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal., 211 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Cal. 2009) 
(“We are not persuaded that because the coverage clause of ACSC’s policy does 
not use the words ‘neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured,’ the word ‘accident’ as used in the policy means that whether an event 
is an accident must be determined from the injured party’s viewpoint.  The 
phrase ‘neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured’ in 
earlier comprehensive general liability policies has been construed as modifying 
the policy term ‘injury and damages,’ not ‘accident.’ ” ). 
 
it is clear that in all contexts the insured’s mental state is the 
focus.  While act and intent are both aspects of the concept of 
an “accident,” the policy’s focus on expectation and intent has 
caused coverage determinations to be more profoundly shaped 
by the court’s assessment of the specific insured’s mental 
state than by an analysis whether the average person would 
consider the loss an accident.  This approach is necessary 
because specific inclusion in the policy of “expected-intended” 
language requires that it be given an interpretation that 
separates the language from the definition of accident, 
otherwise the language is redundant. Courts generally decry 
redundancy and attempt to interpret insurance policies to 
 121. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation Construction and Application 
of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended 
or Expected By the Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 § 4(a) (1984) (collecting decisions 
holding that terms “expected” and “intended” are synonymous).  
 122. Id. § 4(b) (collecting decisions holding that the terms “expected” and 
“intended” are distinct). 
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avoid redundancy.123
Three approaches have been developed to determine 
whether a certain course of action will be deemed 
“intentional” for purposes of the exclusion: 
 
The classic tort approach of deeming results and losses 
intended, if they are the natural and probable consequences 
of the insured’s loss producing actions.124
The middle ground approach that deems results and 
losses intended if the insured intended the loss producing 




The subjective intent approach that deems results and 
losses intended only if the insured actually intended to inflict 
the very type of loss actually sustained.
 
126
The first approach calculates intent based on the 
objective, reasonable person standard.  If such a person would 
comprehend the consequences of his actions, the insured is 
irrebuttably presumed as a matter of law to have 
contemplated and appreciated the consequences of his 
behavior.  The second and third approaches focus on the 
 
 
 123. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1268–69, 1276 (Cal. 
1990) (refusing to adopt interpretation of insurance policy term that would 
render other terms and provisions of the policy “redundant”); Dimmitt 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1993) 
(stating that “to construe sudden also to mean unintended and unexpected 
would render the words sudden and accidental entirely redundant,” which 
should be avoided).  The reference in Dimmitt Chevrolet was to the 1970 
Qualified Pollution Exclusion in the ISO CGL form.  Id. at 703.  
 124. Meridian Oil Prod., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 27 F.3d 150, 
152 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Texas law).  In some cases this test is associated 
with the coverage term “accident” rather than the “expected-intended” 
exclusion.  See City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 
1057–58 (8th Cir. 1979) (collecting decisions); see also Murray v. Landenberger, 
215 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (“While we may wish to say that the 
result, which is the natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of a willful 
act, or intentional course of action, is not an ‘accident,’ as that term is used in 
this insurance policy, we cannot do so in the light of the general rule.”). 
 125. State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Martin, 710 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1999) (holding 
that there was no coverage for wrongful death of fire-fighters killed while 
extinguishing arson fire instigated by insured to destroy the property so that a 
claim could be made for the insurance proceeds); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 
v. American Emps.’ Ins. Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460, 466 (Ct. App. 1984).  
 126. Cf. Conn. Indem. Co., v. Nestor, 145 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) 
(permitting indemnification when child set a fire to frighten inhabitants of a 
structure, but the fire spread causing extensive property damage); see generally 
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, §5.4(d) (discussing availability of liability 
insurance coverage for intentional conduct).  
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insured’s subjective intent and treat the issue as one of 
actual, rather than implied, intent.  The two approaches 
differ in the specific consequence the insured must 
comprehend; the second approach requires that the insured 
comprehend and intend the consequence of some harm; the 
third approach requires that the insured appreciate and 
intend the specific consequence that is the basis of the claim 
asserted against the insured. 
California courts have not engaged in extensive analysis 
of the “expected-intended” exclusion.  Instead, as noted in this 
article, the courts’ focus has been on section 533’s statutory 
exclusion for loss resulting from a willful act and the general 
understanding of what distinguishes an “accident” 
(negligence) from a deliberate loss (willful act).  What 
California case law does exist, however, suggests a narrow 
application of the terms “expected” and “intended,” when the 
terms are used as a limitation on coverage. 
The most extensive discussion of the “expected-intended” 
language can be found in Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss 
Ins. Co.127  Shell Oil Co. involved environmental 
contamination over many years at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal, a United States Army complex.  Shell settled the 
environmental claims (cost of cleanup) and sought to hold its 
insurers responsible for those costs.  The insurers argued, 
among other things, that Shell expected or intended the 
environmental damage or part of its operations as a lessee on 
the complex grounds.  The court concluded that the terms 
“expected” and “intended,” in the context of a policy exclusion, 
were not ambiguous.128
The ordinary and popular meaning of “expect” connotes 
subjective knowledge of or belief in an event’s probability. 
We see no material difference if the degree of that 
probability is expressed as substantially certain, 
practically certain, highly likely, or highly probably; the 
terms are minor shadings of the same idea. All convey the 
ordinary and popular sense that we do not think of events 
we “expect” as absolute certainties. Accordingly, we cannot 
adopt the more restrictive interpretation of some courts 
that “the phrase ‘neither expected nor intended’ should be 
  With respect to the term “expected,” 
the court concluded: 
 
 127. 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815 (Ct. App. 1993).  
 128. Id. at 835.  
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read only to exclude those damages that the insured knew 
would flow directly and immediately from its intentional 
act.”129
The court did not provide a separate definition of 
“intended;” however, it did indicate that it would set a 
similarly high standard for that term by citing and approving 
an out-of-state decision in which the court had defined 




The problem here is that while we have some 
understanding as to what the terms “expected” and 
“intended” mean in the context of an exclusion when the 
objective is clearly focused, that consensus quickly collapses 
when we expand the focus beyond the obvious.  For example, 
if the insured wishes to burn the insured premises to collect 
the insurance proceeds, there is no confusion as to the 
insured’s aims, intentions, and expectations.  What are the 
insured’s aims, intentions, and expectations if the arson fire 
results in bodily injury to others, e.g., tenants, guests, or 
firefighters?  What if the insured sets the fire as a practical 
joke, not specifically expecting nor intending injury to 
result?
 which sets a very high threshold for an insurer to 
meet as it effectively encompasses the “intend to inflict the 
actual injury” test. 
131
 
 129. Id. (citations omitted).  
  The law has developed a number of tests to resolve 
this problem, but the fact remains that once we broaden the 
 130. Id. 
Our conclusion on the meaning of “expected or intended” is not unique. 
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, adopted essentially the same 
interpretation, albeit without examining the words’ ordinary and 
popular meanings. The court decided that damage “ ‘ . . . which is either 
expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured’”  refers only to 
damage “that the insured in fact subjectively wanted (‘intended’) to be a 
result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain 
(‘expected’) to be a result of his conduct.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 131. Compare Trafalski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 685 N.Y.S. 2d 351 (App. Div. 
1999) (holding that insurer failed to establish as a matter of law that insured 
reasonably expected victim to sustain burn injuries when he set the victim’s 
jeans on fire while engaging in horseplay), with Morner v. Giuliano, 857 N.E.2d 
602 (holding that discharge of BB gun that caused injury greater than shooter 
expected could not as a matter of law be deemed an accident); but see State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W. 2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973) (affirming trial 
judge’s finding that insured who fired B-B gun intending “to scare somebody” 
did not intend or expect to inflict harm on person who was struck by BB).  
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scope of our focus beyond what was actually the insured’s 
aims, intentions, and expectations, we create a legal construct 
that attributes to the insured as a matter of law certain aims, 
intentions, and expectations.  Moreover, interpretation of the 
terms “expected” or “intended” in the context of an exclusion 
does not mean that the terms will receive the same 
interpretation when used to define the scope of coverage.  
What is “expected” when the term is used to define an 
“accident” may vary from what is “expected” when the term is 
a limitation on coverage simply because a different rule of 
construction applies—coverage terms are construed broadly, 
limitations on coverage are construed narrowly. 
The “intended-expected” language creates a zone of legal 
responsibility that often operates independently of the 
insured’s actual intentions and expectations.132  Courts 
attribute certain intentions and expectations to the insured, 
regardless of the insured’s actual mental state, consistent 
with the court’s view whether indemnification is proper given 
the insured’s conduct and the social context in which the 
conduct occurs.133  We can see this in the child molestation 
cases.  Courts have simply ignored extensive social science 
research that molesters often do not intend or expect harm to 
their victims.134
 
 132. Courts occasionally assert that identifying a person’s actual 
expectations is “difficult, if not impossible.”  Wickman v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 908 
F.2d 1077, 1087–88 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he subjective state of the mind of the 
insured cannot be generally known.” (quoting Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
410, 419 (Utah 1983))).  As an abstract, metaphysical question the court is 
possibly correct; however, courts are frequently called on to determine whether 
a person actually intended or expected a certain consequence, as for example, 
when the issue of scienter or malice is involved.  In these contexts, courts 
exhibit no hesitancy or reluctance to make the necessary factual determinations 
of actual expectation, intention, or knowledge. 
  Rather, courts, perhaps more sensitive to the 
 133. See Rigelhaupt, supra note 74, § 4.  
 134. J.C. Penney Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 700 (Cal. 1991): 
Defendants and their amici curiae argue at length that psychiatric 
testimony would show that child molesters are really sheep in wolves’ 
clothing—that their abuse of children is an attempt at affection. We are 
reluctant to venture into uncertain territory still being explored by 
psychiatrists. We note, however, that testimony, psychiatric or 
otherwise, that no harm was intended flies in the face of all reason, 
common sense, and experience. Such testimony is also irrelevant in 
light of the rule that a child molester’s subjective intent is irrelevant to 
the question of insurance coverage. Moreover, if psychiatry can 
satisfactorily corroborate defendants’ view and demonstrate the need 
for a change in the law, the proper forum is the Legislature, where 
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political and social situation, have consistently invoked the 
legal fiction that intent to harm necessarily exists on the part 
of sexual molesters to preclude indemnification.135  It is 
questionable whether the legal fiction of “intent to harm” 
works properly and optimally when interpreting the 
“expected-intended” exclusion.  Those concerns are ratcheted 
up exponentially when the court applies the “expected-
intended” legal fiction as a gloss on a willful act (section 533) 
and thereby, defines, as a matter of public policy, what may 
be insured and what may not be insured.  There are many 
accepted coverage areas, such as defective product design or 
defamation,136
 
 where coverage would be questionable under 
the view that to constitute an accident under an occurrence 
policy the event itself must be unexpected or unintended.  
Simply put, neither a defective design nor a defamatory 
publication is an unexpected or unintended event; yet, I 
suspect that there is no disagreement that losses resulting 
from mistaken decisions that produce a defectively designed 
product or a defamatory statement are proper subjects for 
liability insurance coverage.  The California courts conflation 
of section 533’s concept of “willful act” with accidental means” 





broad-based, perhaps conflicting empirical evidence can be presented 
and considered.  
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 135. See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purdy, 483 N.W.2d 197, 200 (S.D. 
1992) (“[T]he majority view in criminal sexual contact cases is to infer, as a 
matter of law, that harm was expected or intended. We find the majority 
position persuasive.”); Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 
909, 911 (Colo. App. 1997) (“[I]ntent to harm is inferred as a matter of law when 
the defendant has engaged in sexual misconduct with a child.”); see generally 
David S. Florig, Insurance Coverage for Sexual Abuse or Molestation, 30 TORT & 
INS. L. J. 699, 699–700 (1995) (“Most courts refuse coverage to the insured 
perpetrator of abuse when the perpetrator is an adult and the victim is a minor.  
In such cases the nearly unanimous rule is that the intent to injure is inferred 
as a matter of law from the act of abuse itself (the inferred intent rule).”).  
 136. “Personal and advertising injury” is defined in the standard CGL policy 
to encompass a number of deliberate offenses, including false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, defamatory publication, etc.  See GENERAL LIABILITY FORM, supra 
note 16, at 5.  
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V. WHAT IS AN ACCIDENT REVISITED 
“Accident” has no a priori meaning.137  When courts 
addressed the issue in the past, they gave the term “accident” 
an inclusive construction, stating that an accident could refer 
to both mishaps and unforeseen consequences.138
We might begin by asking what considerations are 
driving California courts to adopt such a constrained view of 
the concept of an accident?  Courts may be concerned that a 
broad conception of the term “accident” provides no logical 
stopping point if an accident includes unanticipated 
consequences of deliberate conduct.
  The current 
trend by California courts to define the term “accident” 
narrowly is, thus, inconsistent with historic practice. 
139
Courts appear to be wary of the ease by which 
unexpectedness may be alleged.  Expert evidence that the 
insured did not expect the consequences of his conduct is 
generally shunned and decision-making by a trier-of-fact is 
avoided.
  The assertions that the 
insured intended, expected, or otherwise anticipated the 
consequences of his conduct are just that—assertions.  They 
are not based on expert evidence or a fully developed record. 
140  Judges use their own internal sense of the 
insured’s state of mind, “the nature of things,” or the 
proverbial “judicial hunch”141
 
 137. Burr v. Commercial Traveler’s Mut. Acc. Ins. Co., 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 
(N.Y. 1946). 
 to justify the conclusion that the 
Legal scholars have spent much effort in attempts to evolve a sound 
theory of causation and to explain the nature of an ‘accident.’ 
Philosophers and lexicographers have attempted definition with results 
which have been productive of immediate criticism. No doubt the 
average man would find himself at a loss if asked to formulate a 
written definition of the word. Certainly he would say that the term 
applied only to an unusual and extraordinary happening; that it must 
be the result of chance; that the cause must be unanticipated or, if 
known, the result must be unexpected. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. See Geddes & Smith Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 
558, 563–64 (1959); Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251. 
 139. This problem has been identified from a different perspective by Ellen 
Pryor who has questioned whether insureds would optimally desire liability 
insurance for intentionally inflicted losses. Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: 
Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 
1746 (1997).  
 140. See cases cited supra note 98 (noting tendency of court to treat question 
as outside purview of the jury); see also Rigelhaupt, supra note 121, § 4(b) 
(noting judicial unwillingness to consider expert evidence).  
 141. The judicial hunch can be seen as a byproduct of the judge’s experience 
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conduct for which the insured is being sued was not an 
accident, and therefore, not covered.  This, of course, is a 
recurrent event in the law. The “reasonable person” standard 
and the insured’s “reasonable expectations of coverage” test 
are common examples of judicial constructs.  Judges will, in 
the absence of more specific authority, necessarily opine on 
these issues.142
Tied to the above is perhaps a related concern caused by 
broad definitions of the insurer’s duty to defend.  California, 
along with many jurisdictions, holds that an insurer must 
provide the insured with a defense whenever the complaint 
alleges a complaint “potentially” within coverage.
  Courts avoid the expansion of liability 
insurance coverage that the presence of an allegation of 
“unintendedness” or “unexpectedness” would permit by 
simply declining to allow the allegation to be considered. 
143  
“Potentially,” while not unlimited,144 casts a broad net.145
 
and situation sense.  See Joseph C. Hutchenson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: 
The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285–86 
(1929).  However, it can also be seen as a means of collecting a series of decision 
points that may permit a more informed and better reasoned decision over the 
long term.  See generally Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling 
Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. 79, 79 (1959). 
  
 142. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revisited (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904555# (working paper 
discussing preference of courts to use legal fictions to camouflage policy-based 
decisions).   
 143. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 773 (Cal. 1997); CNA Cas. of 
Cal. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Ct. App. 1986).  
 144. Hurley Const. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 
631 (Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he insured may not speculate about unpled third party 
claims to manufacturer coverage”); but cf. Stone v. Hartford Cas. Co., 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“The potential for coverage may arise 
from the underlying complaint, the terms of the policy, possible amendments to 
the complaint, or any other extrinsic evidence known to the insurer which 
would give rise to liability under the policy, even if coverage is ultimately found 
lacking.” (citations omitted)). 
 145. Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Club Aquarius, Inc., 169 Cal. Rptr. 685, 686 (Ct. 
App. 1980) (“[T]here exists a duty on the insurer to defend an action if potential 
liability to pay exists, even though that potential liability to pay is remote.”); 
CNA Cas., 222 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (holding that despite the federal court’s 
dismissal of the pendent second cause of action, which was the sole basis for 
raising the insurer’s duty to defend, the possibility that the complaint could still 
be amended had it not been precluded; therefore, there remained the possibility 
that a claim within coverage would be asserted and the insurer’s duty to defend 
attached); see also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176 n. 15 (Cal. 1966) 
(stating that the duty to defend is excused only where “the third party 
complaint can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which could bring it 
within the policy coverage”).  
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Moreover, to escape the defense obligation, the insurer must 
conclusively establish that no duty to defend exists.146  Failing 
that, the insurer must defend the entire claim even though 
only a portion of the claim is potentially within coverage.147  
And, the consequences for breaching the duty to defend can 
be draconian.148
The practical effect of the above is that unless courts 
treat certain types of claims as de jure outside coverage, 
insurers would be forced to defend, and perhaps compromise 
with payment, claims that courts have repeatedly said should 
not be covered.  The sentiment that such a requirement is bad 
public policy appears to be generally accepted when applied to 
child molesters and their ilk.  The problem is the approach 
lacks a thesis that limits it to the perceived evil that spawned 
 
 
 146. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 
1993). 
To prevail, the insured must prove the existence of a potential for 
coverage, while the insurer must establish the absence of any such 
potential. In other words, the insured need only show that the 
underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must 
prove it cannot. Facts merely tending to show that the claim is not 
covered, or may not be covered, but are insufficient to eliminate the 
possibility that resultant damages (or the nature of the action) will fall 
within the scope of coverage, therefore add no weight to the scales. Any 
seeming disparity in the respective burdens merely reflects the 
substantive law.  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 147. Buss, 939 P.2d at 775. 
 148. Under California law the insurer who breaches the duty to defend must 
pay as damages the reasonable defense costs paid or incurred by the insured.  
See Hogan v. Midland Nat’l Ins. Co., 476 P.2d 825, 831–32 (Cal. 1970).  The 
insured may enter into a “reasonable” settlement of the claim in good faith and 
may then maintain an action against the insurer to recover the amount of the 
settlement up to policy limits.  Clark v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 832, 
837 (Ct. App. 1980).  Under such circumstances the insurer must reimburse the 
insured for her settlement costs unless the insurer can demonstrate that the 
settlement was reached through fraud and collusion or the insured was not 
covered by insurance for the underlying claim.  Sunseri v. Camperas Del Valle 
Stables, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 23, 24 (Ct. App. 1986) (stipulated judgment).  The 
insurer’s tortious rejection of the defense may subject the insurer to liability for 
a judgment in excess of policy limits.  Bogard v. Emp’rs Cas. Co., 210 Cal. Rptr. 
578, 583 (Ct. App. 1985).  Similarly, the tortious handling of the defense or the 
abrupt termination of the defense in a manner that prejudices the insured may 
subject the insurer to a judgment in excess of policy limits.  See Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1986).  The insurer’s breach of the 
duty to defend may subject it to an excess of limits exposure if there is a within 
limits offer of settlement that the insured cannot accept because of financial 
limitations or the unavailability of other insurance resources.  See Safeco. Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Parks, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 730, 742–43 (Ct. App. 2009).  
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it. Courts have extended the approach to areas outside the 
child molestation coverage claims in which these arguments 
were initially formulated.  There is no principled basis for 
constraining the expansion of the legal fiction that the 
insured can be deemed to have intended to harm the victim-
claimant if the insured acted deliberately.  If courts are 
concerned that a broad definition of accident has no logical 
stopping place, the court’s answer suffers from the reverse 
concern—contraction of the concept of accident post J.C. 
Penney Cas. Ins. Co. has no logical stopping place other than 
the Minoan labyrinth of “accidental means.” 
Consider in this regard the decision in State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company v. Superior Court.149  The insured (Lint) 
and another person (Wright) began to argue.  Lint picked up 
Wright with the intent to throw Wright in the pool, which he 
did.  Unfortunately, Lint didn’t throw Wright far enough.  
Wright landed on the pool steps and sustained serious injury.  
One would think, based on Mendez, that such conduct would 
be deemed not an accident.  The conduct (throwing the person 
in the pool) was deliberate; the result (injury due to 
misjudgment on the part of the insured as to the amount of 
force necessary to accomplish that objective) was 
unanticipated, but there was nothing in the conduct that 
suggested a mishap or inadvertent act.  The court, however, 
found that here the injury was the result of an accident.  The 
court noted that an accident refers to “the intended or 
unexpected” consequence of the act,150 which was, according to 
the court, arguably the case here.151
 
 149. 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2008).  
  The court distinguished 
 150. Id. at 833 (emphasis in original).  
 151. Id. at 836. 
Although he deliberately picked up Wright and threw him in the pool, 
Lint did not intend or expect the consequence, namely, that Wright 
would land on a step. Lint miscalculated one aspect in the causal series 
of events leading to Wright’s injury, namely, the force necessary to 
throw Wright far enough out into the pool so that he would land in the 
water.  It is disputed that Lint did not intend to hurt Wright; he merely 
intended that Wright land farther out into the water and “get  
. . . wet.” No doubt Lint acted recklessly . . . Lint rashly threw Wright 
at the pool without expecting that Wright would land on the cement 
step.  Stated otherwise, the act directly responsible for Wright’s injury, 
throwing too softly so as to miss the water, was an unforeseen or 
undesigned happening or consequence and was thus fortuitous.  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Mendez by asserting: 
[T]he act directly responsible for Wright’s injury, throwing 
too softly so as to miss the water, was an unforeseen or 
undesigned happening or consequence and was thus 
fortuitous. The event here was an accident because not all 
of the acts, the manner in which they were done, and the 
objective accomplished transpired exactly as Lint 
intended.152
The court’s purported distinction of Mendez is, however, 
illusory. If the insured’s mistake in the mental calculation of 
the amount of force necessary to carry out the objective 
transforms willful conduct into an “accident,” then all 




Courts initially triangulated the concept of accident to 
permit them to carve out an exception for molestation cases.  
One suspects that the carve out does not generate much 
public disagreement when applied to sexual molestation 
claims.  The carve out has, however, created its own cottage 
industry of legal rules and those rules are now expanding into 
areas, e.g., “horseplay,” or can logically be applied, e.g., “strict 
liability torts” where the policy against indemnity is less clear 
and the lack of clarity is generating confusion.  And, having 
extended into these new areas, there is no logical stopping 
point to stem the tide.
  The insufficient force was not a consequence 
of the insured slipping on a wet surface, which caused the 
insured to exert insufficient force so as to cause the victim to 
hit the pool steps rather than the pool water.  All deliberate 
conduct is the product of human calculation. Coverage was 
proper in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company because, 
while the insured engaged in deliberate conduct, he did so 
with a reasonably mistaken belief that no serious injury 




 152. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
  The problem is no formula or test 
 153. Several California courts have distinguished State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company v. Superior Court on the ground that it was decided prior to 
Delgado.  See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 313–
14 (Ct. App. 2011).  As noted previously, however, Delgado is somewhat limited 
as a precedent due to its unique facts (unreasonable belief in need for self-
defense).  See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.  
 154. See, e.g., Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310 (horseplay resulting in groin 
injury; court found no accident even though court held that injury was not 
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has been announced that permits a rational guess as to when 
an unanticipated loss arising from deliberate conduct will be 
deemed an accident and when it will be deemed not an 
accident.  The courts have been placed in the same position as 
Kipling’s young jaguar whose mother told him that if he 
found a tortoise, he should scoop it out of its shell and if he 
found a hedgehog he should hold it in water until it uncoils, 
but did not instruct him how to tell a tortoise from a 
hedgehog.155
In all of these cases restrictively interpreting the concept 
of “accident,” the claim can be made that the insured acted 
negligently based on a mistaken belief; however, assessment 
of the veracity of that alleged belief is difficult because the 
assessment centers on the insured’s subjective awareness and 
intentions.  While subjective belief may be established by 
circumstantial evidence, much of this evidence is likely in the 
insured’s control or is privileged.  Moreover, at the time the 
insured’s subjective belief is being assessed, the insured has a 
self-motivated reason to lie.  Claiming mistake gains access to 
insurance.  While these factors may be present in some 
typical negligence cases, e.g., road rage verses negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle, these factors are invariably 
present in the cases when California courts have expressed a 
reserved, restricted understanding of the concept of accident. 
 
It is not unusual for courts to exhibit caution when 
confronted with situations when subjective beliefs 
significantly influence the availability of legal rights.  Non-
economic damages, e.g., emotional distress,156
 
intended); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 544–45 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (trespass resulting from mistaken belief as to location of property 
line; court found there was no accident even if belief was reasonable); Lyons v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 
sexual touching resulted from mistaken belief that consent to touch existed; 
court held mistaken belief, even if reasonable, did not make touching 
accidental). 
 and negligent 
 155. RUDYARD KIPLING, The Beginning of the Armadillos, in JUST SO 
STORIES FOR LITTLE CHILDREN 101–02 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1902). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965) (noting concerns 
that claims for emotional distress can be easily falsified); see Hernandez v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 975 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that purpose 
behind limitation on emotional distress claims is to guard against fraud and 
exaggeration); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Mass. 1982) (noting 
that “emotional distress can be both real and serious in some situations, while 
trivial, evanescent, feigned, or imagined in others”). 
FISCHER FINAL 4/26/2014  1:16 PM 
112 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
infliction of emotional distress157
Further compounding the confusion in this area is the 
fact that in expanding the carve out first developed in the 
molestation cases, the courts have used the statutory 
exclusion, thereby incorporating the approach into all 
insurance policies and correspondingly negating, sub silencio, 
substantial case law in the process. 
 are two examples of 
situations where the subjectivity of the subject matter 
influences doctrinal development.  That factor may be at play 
here. 
Consider for example, the impact of this approach on the 
often cited decision in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.158  In Gray, the 
California Supreme Court expounded extensively on the 
proper interpretation of an exclusion, which rejected coverage 
for loss “caused intentionally by or at the direction of the 
insured.”159  The insured was involved in an automobile 
accident that escalated into a fight.  The insured was sued for 
battery.  He claimed he acted in self-defense.  The court 
concluded that the exclusion was ambiguous as to whether it 
barred coverage because the insured may have acted 
reasonably in self-defense or the complaint may be amended 
to allege the insured acted negligently.  The Section 533 
statutory exclusion was briefly referenced and found to be 
inapplicable because the statute did not extend to the duty to 
defend and a “mere accusation of a willful tort” does not 
implicate the statute.160




Delgado relies on that statement from Gray and on several 
cases that have cited Gray for the proposition that acts 
done in self-defense are unintentional and therefore 
accidental. 
 the Court was again confronted with a claim that 
self-defense converted deliberate conduct into an accident.  
The insured relied on Gray. The court summarily dismissed 
the reference: 
 
 157. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 12.3 (2nd Ed. 2006) 
(noting requirement that before plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress plaintiff must satisfy “physical harm” or “manifestation of 
harm” requirements to corroborate genuineness of claim). 
 158. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966). 
 159. Id. at 170–71. 
 160. Id. at 177. 
 161. 211 P.3d 1083 (Cal. 2009). 
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That reliance is misplaced. Gray and the cases that have 
cited it pertained to the question of unreasonable use of 
force or unreasonable self-defense in the context of an 
insurance policy’s exclusionary clauses, not as here in the 
context of a policy’s coverage clause. At issue here is 
whether unreasonable self-defense comes within the 
policy’s coverage for “an accident,” not whether it falls 
within a particular policy exclusion.162
But if the concept of an accident underlying the statutory 
exclusion is as constrained as the courts have held, then what 
room is there for any term in the policy that applies to the 
concept of an “accident”?  Because section 533 sets state 
policy, it cannot be expanded by a broader definition of 
“accident” in the coverage provision. What public policy bars 
may not be reintroduced by policy language.
 
163  Because 
section 533 sets state policy, it cannot be expanded by a 
narrow interpretation of the “expected-intended” exclusion.  
The effect of a narrow interpretation of the “expected-
intended” exclusion would be to suggest the possibility of 
coverage that is foreclosed by the narrow definition of an 
accident required by section 533.  Because section 533 sets 
state policy, the self-defense exception to the standard ISO 
“expected-intended” exclusion is a nullity if injury inflicted in 
self-defense is not an accident, which Delgado implies and a 
recent California court has suggested.164




 162. Id. at 1089–90 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 the Court adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the section 533 statutory exclusion 
that left to the parties to the insurance contract primary 
responsibility for delineating the scope of the liability 
insurance coverage.  The courts’ current approach, which 
broadly, but uncertainly, asserts that unintended or 
unexpected consequences may or may not reflect an accident, 
 163. Combs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 920 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (concluding that insurer cannot indemnify an insured for a loss that 
is “willful” pursuant to Section 533); cf. Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. 
Co., 110 P.3d 903, 907 (Cal. 2006) (insurers may not write around statutorily 
mandated language). 
 164. Sutton v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of Southern California, No. 
B198855, 2010 WL 522719, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. February 16, 2010).  The 
insurance policy did not have a self-defense exception, but under the reasoning 
of this case, such an exception would fall under the constraint imposed by 
section 533. 
 165. 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978). 
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takes away from the parties to the insurance contract the 
ability to define the scope of coverage.  This is done by 
tethering the definition of an accident to the statutory concept 
of willful act. Even if one concedes that the initial decision to 
carve out coverage for molestation claims was proper, the 
extension of that carve out into more general areas such as 
injuries arising from “horseplay” or “practical jokes” raises 
serious concern and substantial confusion as to what is an 
“accident” under California law.  A return to Clemmer’s 
“preconceived design to injure” would obviate these problems 
and restore to the parties to the liability insurance contract 
the ability to define the scope of the desired coverage.  Courts 
could preserve the denial of coverage for child molestation 
because of the de jure presumption of intent to injure, which 
while factually questionable, has been universally accepted 
for public policy reasons.166
CONCLUSION 
 
Historically, courts have understood the concept of an 
“accident” to encompass the unintended or unexpected 
consequences of deliberate conduct.  That construction has 
long been also understood to conform to the popular, lay 
understanding of the term.  These reasons should inform the 
construction of the term “accident” in the standard liability 
insurance policy.  This does not ignore concerns that insurers 
may be required to provide a defense to insureds accused of 
deliberately injuring another whenever an insured claims 
that the injury was unintended.  Providing a defense to a 
charge of wrongdoing has not been understood as raising 
public policy concerns as does indemnifying a person for the 
financial consequences of intentionally causing injury to 
another.167
 
 166. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 693 (Cal. 1991) 
(noting that every court that has considered the issue of insurance coverage for 
child molestation has, almost without exception, held there is no coverage).  The 
jurisdictional alignment has not changed in the intervening twenty years. 
  Moreover, a claim of unintended or unexpected 
consequences must be reasonable; otherwise, no duty to 
 167. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 178 (Cal. 1966) (holding that 
public policy preventing insurance coverage from encouragement of willful tort 
by denying wrongdoer indemnification for the wrong is not violated when the 
insurer provides a defense against the accusation of willful wrongdoing; 
providing a defense does not encourage wrongful conduct). 
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defend is owed.168  Finally, insurers retain the power of the 
pen.  They can draft specific exclusions to coverage if the risk, 
and its related cost, is undesirable from an underwriting 
perspective.169
Unless conduct is inherently dangerous, there is no 
reason for a public policy rule that focuses exclusively on 
conduct to determine if the actor may be indemnified for the 
consequences of that conduct.  It is simply meaningless for 
the courts to engage in an extended analysis of an insured’s 
conduct without expressly evaluating that conduct in the 
larger context of the harm resulting from that conduct.  The 
law long ago made peace with the idea that losses resulting 
from negligent conduct would not violate public policy.
 
170  
That position has been extended to reckless conduct.171
 
 168. It must, however, be acknowledged that insurers face a difficult burden 
of persuasion on this issue.  Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 
P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1993) (holding that to escape the duty to defend 
altogether, the insurer must establish that the underlying claim cannot come 
within policy coverage). 
  And 
while the resolve still exists, for the most part, not to extend 
coverage to deliberately inflicted losses, the critical insight is 
that the concern is focused on the intention to cause the 
harm, not the intention to engage in the act.  A driver who 
intends to speed does not lose coverage when speeding results 
in a loss because, while the loss is foreseeable, it is not the 
object of the actor’s conduct.  A person who touches another 
 169. Carson v. Mercury Ins. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 532 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(“It is a well-established principle that an insurer has the right to limit policy 
coverage in plain and understandable language and that it may limit the nature 
of the risk it undertakes to assume.”). 
 170. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT 
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 3 (Harvard University Press 2008) 
(particularly chapter VI, which discusses the relationship between tort law and 
liability insurance). 
 171. Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 833 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Nevertheless, it is now clear that section 533 does not prohibit coverage 
for reckless conduct. Also, the Supreme Court has said in dictum that 
some forms of conduct amounting to a conscious disregard to others’ 
safety might not constitute an uninsurable “willful act” under section 
533. As a practical matter, the distinction between reckless conduct 
and “positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute disregard of [an 
act’s] possibly damaging consequences” is too fine to be significant.  
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see Sheehan v. Goriansky, 72 
N.E.2d 538, 543 (Mass. 1947) (holding that reckless conduct on the part of the 
insured does not mean that the resulting loss was not accidental); see also 
Meyer v. Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 542, 546 (1965) (same). 
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believing, mistakenly as it turns out, that the touching is 
desired does not act to cause injury.  The law may treat the 
touching as a battery,172
Liability insurance and tort law reflect a grand bargain 
constructed by courts and legislatures over the course of the 
20
 but that legal classification does not 
define the actor’s mental intentions or expectations for 
purposes of liability insurance coverage. 
th century to engage in risk spreading.  Liability insurance 
is the funding mechanism that enables tortfeasors to 
efficiently absorb the risks assigned to them by the tort 
system.173  In a real and meaningful way, liability insurance 
law and tort law exist in an equilibrium.  Tort law cannot 
exceed the capacity of liability insurance; if it does, there is no 
capacity to pay claims and risk spreading fails.  Liability 
insurance law must be responsive to the demands of tort law 
for the same reason.174
Liability insurance by its terms covers accidents.  As this 
article has attempted to demonstrate, an accident can be an 
open-ended question.  The critical question, however, is 
 
 
 172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965). 
If an act is done with the intention described in this Section, it is 
immaterial that the actor is not inspired by any personal hostility to 
the other, or a desire to injure him. Thus the fact that the defendant 
who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another does so as a 
practical joke, does not render him immune from liability so long as the 
other has not consented. This is true although the actor erroneously 
believes that the other will regard it as a joke, or that the other has, in 
fact, consented to it. One who plays dangerous practical jokes on others 
takes the risk that his victims may not appreciate the humor of his 
conduct and may not take it in good part.  
Id.  There has been some debate whether the tort of battery should (or does) 
contain an intent to harm element.  See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in 
the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) 
(surveying the conflicting commentary and case law). 
 173. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961).  Not all commentators agree that risk 
distribution should be the basis for tort liability, but it appears to have been the 
most influential reason for judicial extension of tort liability in the twenty 
century.  Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of 
Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1595 (1997) (“Historically, the most 
prominent justifications for strict products liability have compared products 
manufacturers to insurers”); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120–22 (1960) (noting the 
influence of Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., which espoused the argument of risk distribution as the justification for 
manufacturer product liability). 
 174. See sources cited supra note 51. 
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whether that open-endedness should be artificially 
constrained by a narrow focus on the operative conduct by the 
insured without explicit consideration of the insured’s 
understanding of the likely consequences of that conduct.  
The conclusion offered is that it should not. Courts should 
accept and apply the traditional and general understanding 
that deliberate conduct that results in foreseeable, but 
unintended or unexpected, consequences is an accident.175
 
  As 
such, the practical joke that misfires and causes unintended 
or unexpected injury should be no less a candidate for 
coverage as an accident than an errantly driven automobile or 
golf ball. 
 
 175. Outlaw v. Bituminious Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (La. Ct. App. 
1978) (holding that where insured drove his golf ball and hit a nine-year-old 
who raised his head above a golf bad, and the driven ball struck the nine-year 
old in the eye, destroying his sight, the insured golfer was negligent and the 
insurer would be liable).  There are no reported cases where a court has treated 
a golfing injury as non-accidental, although there are numerous cases 
addressing the liability of golfers whose deliberately, but errantly, driven golf 
balls strike another.  David M. Holliday, Annotation, Liability to One Struck by 
Golf Ball, 53 A.L.R. 4th 282 (1987). 
